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HOW SCIENCE HAS INFLUENCED, BUT SHOULD NOW
DETERMINE, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
JAN G. LAITOS*
This is an article about science and environmental law. More
specifically, it is an article about two different versions of science, and
how each has affected environmental law and the development of envi-
ronmental policy. The emergence of science-driven environmental law
has significantly affected how humans view and respond to the natural
world that makes up the biosphere, which is the thin envelope surrounding
the Earth that permits the human species to exist. This Article argues that
humans, and law-makers, should embrace a different role for science. In-
stead of science answering “what is” questions, it should also explain the
universal laws of the natural environment, so environmental laws can be
consistent with those fundamental natural laws. Only then can environ-
mental policy, and its laws, successfully ensure that the biosphere will
continue to be a home for humans.
Environmental law was “invented” approximately fifty years ago.1
In the 1960s, the United States Congress reacted to the growing awareness
of human-caused threats to the natural environment by enacting the
Water Quality Act of 1965,2 and then the Natural Environmental Policy
Act of 1969.3 These statutes were just the beginning of an enormous
number of environmental laws and regulations, which were put in place
to address the widely held perception that human behavior has been ad-
versely affecting the natural environment, and the health and safety of
humans living in that environment.4 Environmental policy has guided
these many laws. This policy has been based on various assumptions
about how the environment works and how humans behave. Science has
provided law-makers with models about how the environment functions
and the ways humans make choices about this environment. For much
of the lifespan of environmental law, environmental policy has been aided
* Professor of Law and John A. Carver, Jr. Chair, University of Denver Sturm College of
Law.
1 Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of America and the Graying of United States Environ-
mental Law, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 76 (2001).
2 Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965).
3 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970).
4 Id.; Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965).
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by a classical version of science—utilitarian science.5 That type of science
became essential to the formulation of policy.6 Science became the critical
informational input for environmental decision-making.7
Utilitarian science is designed to help policymakers reach answers
addressing “what is.”8 Those who make policy supply the “ought” answers.9
Utilitarian science helps to supply the legal requirements of empirical
proof for environmental causation.10 In addition, environmental statutes
call for policymakers to establish regulatory standards as tools for pre-
venting pollution and human-made waste from creating environmental
and human harm. Utilitarian science sets these standards. This class of
science tells policymakers what is safe for human health and what is not.11
But classical utilitarian science has several limitations that make
it an imperfect fit for environmental law and policy. It often cannot provide
the definitive answers to the questions that environmental policymakers
ask.12 This failure to supply answers is due to the many uncertainties
that surround environmental science.13 Moreover, environmental conclu-
sions based on science can easily be attacked in court, and in the political
arena, for being based on flawed or inadequate data.14 Due in part to these
shortcomings in utilitarian science, commentators and scholars have in-
creasingly suggested that environmental policymakers should instead
consider using a different version of science—explanatory science.
Rather than only determining “what is,” in order to inform policy-
making, explanatory science provides unifying principles necessary to un-
derstand the underlying structure and dynamics of nature and humans.15
5 See Oliver Houck, Tales from a Troubled Marriage: Science and Law in Environmental
Policy, 17 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 163, 165 (2003).
6 Id.
7 Eric Biber, Which Science—Whose Science—How Scientific Disciplines Can Shape En-
vironmental Law, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 476 (2012).
8 See Houck, supra note 5, at 167 (discussing how scientists determined the source of
pollution and then formulated steps to abate it).
9 J.B. Ruhl, The Battle Over Endangered Species Act Methodology, 34 ENVTL. L. 555,
563–65 (2004).
10 See Houck, supra note 5, at 167–69.
11 Id. at 164–65.
12 See, e.g., Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future of the Endangered Species
Act’s Best Available Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397, 438 (2004).
13 Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Science, Judgment and Controversy in Natural
Resource Regulation, 26 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 1, 6 (2005).
14 See Danny Hakim & Eric Lipton, Pesticide Studies Won E.P.A.’s Trust, Until Trump’s
Team Scorned ‘Secret Science’, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018
/08/24/business/epa-pesticides-studies-epidemiology.html [https://perma.cc/97BN-9THE].
15 See Biber, supra note 7, at 512–13.
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Utilitarian science presumes a separation between science and the value
judgments inherent in environmental policy.16 Explanatory science is more
directly linked to policy; it embraces scientific “theories,” such as complex-
ity theory and systems theory,17 as the best way to bring about successful
policy reform.18 The scientific theories that underlie explanatory science
are not separated from policy; they should be integrated into policy, and
influence and shape policy.19
This Article argues that explanatory science should do more than
just “influence” environmental policy. The Article advances the proposition
that, consistent with the Principle of Universality, science should direct
and determine environmental policy. The Principle of Universality is a
manifestation of explanatory science which holds that all laws of nature
must work the same everywhere, and at every time.20 The Principle states
that it does not matter who conducts the experiment testing nature’s laws,
or where or when the test occurs; the results will be the same, regardless
of whether the test involves biology, chemistry, physics, or the forces of
the universe.21 From this generally recognized, but underappreciated,
principle22 follows this realization: For environmental policy to succeed,
it must conform to the demands of the Principle of Universality. And one
of the demands of Universality is this: our laws about nature should be
consistent with the laws of nature.
This Article makes the case that for environmental laws to succeed,
they must reflect and conform to the universal scientific truths of nature.
The mantra for policymakers is simple: successful environmental laws, as
well as the policies that structure and cabin these laws, should adhere
16 Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1613, 1617, 1711 (1995); Biber, supra note 7, at 479.
17 Andrew Macintosh & Debra Wilkinson, Complexity Theory and the Constraints on En-
vironmental Policymaking, 28 J. ENVTL. L. 65, 66 (2016); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems
Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 479, 481, 521–22 (1997).
18 See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Sustainable Development: A Five-Dimensional Algorithm for Environ-
mental Law, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 31, 57, 63 (1999) (stating that complexity theory’s
optimization algorithms should be used to guide sustainable development policy); J.B.
Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, for the Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A
Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J.
849, 852–53 (1996) [hereinafter Ruhl, Complexity Theory].
19 Ruhl, Complexity Theory, supra note 18, at 852–53.
20 NEIL DEGRASSE TYSON, ASTROPHYSICS FOR PEOPLE IN A HURRY 34–38 (2017).
21 Id.; Zoran Pazameta, The Laws of Nature: A Skeptic’s Guide, 24.5 SKEPTICAL INQUIRER
(2000); Paul C.W. Davies & Sara Imari Walker, The hidden simplicity of biology, 79 REP.
PROGRESS PHYSICS 1, 8–9 (2016).
22 See DEGRASSE TYSON, supra note 20, at 35–36, 38.
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to the fundamental laws of the natural world and our biosphere. What
are these universal truths? What laws, or rules, do physical, biological, and
chemical systems all follow? Scientists have begun to unravel nature’s
secrets, the principles which all natural phenomena obey, and which com-
prise nature’s master plan.23 This Article urges that our environmental
policies should closely follow the basic workings that nature employs,
which resonate throughout all the operating systems of the universe.24
Part I discusses the two roles that science has played in the devel-
opment of environmental policy—as a utilitarian tool to provide policy-
makers with evidence and data, and as an explanatory insight into the
unifying principles that describe the behavior of both nature and humans.
Part II addresses how utilitarian science has played a critical role in the
development of environmental law throughout the twentieth century. Its
primary function has been to inform the decision-making of policymakers.
Utilitarian science has helped to define a view of how nature works and
how humans make choices. These assumptions have become embedded in
most of the environmental statutes that now comprise the bulk of envi-
ronmental law.
Part III chronicles how, in the twenty-first century, explanatory
science has sought both to alter the relationship between science and
policy and to cause us to rethink our previous assumptions about the work-
ings of nature and the behavior of humans. Explanatory science suggests
that certain scientific theories, such as complexity theory, chaos theory,
and even game theory, should directly influence environmental policy. As
a result of explanatory science, new environmental laws have been pro-
posed that better reflect the reality of the natural environment as a non-
linear dynamical complex adaptive system. Environmental laws which
embrace this reality opt for adaptive management rules and policies that
protect biodiversity and ecosystem services. Similarly, explanatory science
has yielded new and counter-intuitive empirical realizations about human
behavior. As a result, more twenty-first century laws rely on bottom-up
structures that “nudge” people to make better choices about the environ-
ment, instead of traditional top-down commands and prohibitions.
Part IV proposes a rethinking of environmental law in which science
does more than inform decisions (Part II) or influence policy (Part III). In-
stead, science, particularly explanatory science, should directly determine
23 FRANK WILCZEK, A BEAUTIFUL QUESTION: FINDING NATURE’S DEEP DESIGN 6–11 (2015).
24 See, e.g., Steven Weinberg, Symmetry: A “Key to Nature’s Secrets,” N.Y. REV. BOOKS
(Oct. 27, 2011); CAROL BATCHELOR, OCCAM’S RAZOR: THE SIMPLEST SOLUTION IS THE BEST
SOLUTION (2016).
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policy. One central manifestation of explanatory science—the Principle of
Universality—should be adopted by environmental policymakers so that
environmental laws about nature are consistent with the laws of nature.
Part IV identifies the two principal laws of nature, and offers a model of
environmental policy which would conform to these universal laws. Envi-
ronmental policy that satisfies the Principle of Universality stands a better
chance of succeeding in establishing an environmental agenda that ac-
tually works.
I. THE TWO ROLES OF SCIENCE IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Environmental law consists of statutes, regulations from environ-
mental agencies, executive policies, and countless court cases. This body
of law seeks to address the unassailable fact of human-produced damage
to the natural environment that surrounds us.25 Because the focus of en-
vironmental law is on the physical environment, and because nature is
so complex, environmental policymakers have had to rely on science. Sci-
ence helps decision-makers better understand how laws can best be de-
ployed to (1) deter the human behaviors which adversely alter the many
parts of the biosphere, (2) remediate the damage that has already occurred
to environmental systems, and (3) assess which laws are working and
which are not.26
There are two versions of “science” that have assisted the develop-
ment of environmental law and policy. First, utilitarian science is the
classical science which for decades has helped decision-makers acquire data
and facts about human actions that alter natural conditions and thereby
pose a risk to environmental and human health.27 Utilitarian science in-
forms decision-making.28 The other form of science is explanatory science.
Explanatory science postulates various scientific theories which aid envi-
ronmental decision-making by providing methodologies that explain (1)
how natural systems work and (2) how legal policies can best address
human-caused harm to these systems.29 Explanatory science may either
influence or explicitly direct environmental policy.30
25 Celia I. Campbell-Mohn & Frederico Cheever, Environmental Law, ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA (Nov. 3, 2009), https://www.britannica.com/topic/environmental-law [https://
perma.cc/55R7-YJED].
26 See John Holmes & Rebecca Clark, Enhancing the Use of Science in Environmental
Policy-Making and Regulation, 11 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 702, 705–06, 709 (2008).
27 Houck, supra note 5, at 165.
28 Id.
29 Biber, supra note 7, at 512–13.
30 See id. at 515.
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A. Utilitarian Science
Classical utilitarian science has been, and continues to be, impor-
tant to environmental law as a means of making the proof between pol-
lution and environmental-human harm. In order to establish the need for
some legal remedy, or regulatory response, one needs to demonstrate that
human-generated negative externalities either caused, or had the poten-
tial to cause, some kind of injury.31 Science serves that purpose. Also, when
law-makers decide to pass statutes based on environmental standards,
designed to prevent harm, scientists help to set those standards.32 Utili-
tarian science facilitates environmental standards that determine what
is safe and what is not.33
A number of environmental statutes have been enacted based on
determinations of “unreasonable risk” to human health in the environ-
ment.34 Scientists have been charged with the task of deciding what sub-
stances, and what concentration of those substances, have caused a risk to
human health.35 Environmental statutes requiring cleanups of discarded
or leaking hazardous wastes assume there is a point when a particular
level of cleanup is adequate.36 This question of “how clean is clean” is
squarely within the purview of utilitarian science. Indeed, some environ-
mental statutes make explicit the requirement that administrative agen-
cies rely upon “the best available science” when making decisions.37
These environmental statutes presume some reliable knowledge
about whether the risk of environmental harm exists and whether pollution
31 Mary Jane Angelo, Harnessing the Power of Science in Environmental Law: Why We
Should, Why We Don’t, and How We Can, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1527, 1529 (2008).
32 Standard-setting environmental statutes include, among others, the Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7401 (2012); the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012); the Safe Drinking
Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f(c)–(d) (2012); the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(3) (2012); the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2601(a)–(b)(1) (2012).
33 Houck, supra note 5, at 165.
34 See, e.g., the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136(x)–(bb)
(2012); TSCA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2692 (1976); the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 300f (2012).
35 Biber, supra note 7, at 515.
36 The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)
is responsible for the cleanup of abandoned hazardous and toxic waste sites. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601–9628 (2012).
37 Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361–1431 (2012); Endangered Species
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012). See also Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and
Future of the Endangered Species Act’s Best Available Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397,
401–07 (2004).
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will injure humans or natural systems. These laws assume that those who
enforce the statutes will know what the nature of the harm is, how perva-
sive the harm is, and under what circumstances, or at what concentrations
a pollutant harm is likely to occur to humans or the natural environment.38
This knowledge base extends to an understanding of the technologies and
processes that may be used to minimize the risk of these harms.39 Utili-
tarian science provides the information to help address the effectiveness
of these technologies and whether they are cost-effective.40
The prevailing view is that utilitarian science should determine
facts, which in turn help to inform the decisions of those who set policy.
But informed decision-making is quite different than establishing policy.
Science can identify the kinds of risks that are present due to a toxic
chemical release, but science cannot know how much risk humans should
be willing to tolerate.41 Policy makes that call. Science can reveal facts,
but policy determines the value choices and preferences that ultimately
find expression in environmental laws. Science may be able to predict
whether a reduction in pollution will achieve a certain level of human
health effects, but only policy can announce whether that outcome is op-
timal as a matter of politics and public perception.42 In other words,
classical science is not designed for policy-making; science, in theory, re-
veals what is, while policy seeks to establish what should be.43
This separation between utilitarian science and environmental
policy has been justified because the two disciplines have different pur-
poses and processes. Science sorts out empirical facts to posit the reality
of phenomena, while environmental policy relies on this reality to achieve
38 Doremus, supra note 37, at 399–400.
39 See, e.g., Technology, Pollution Prevention, POLLUTION ISSUES, http://www.pollutionis
sues.com/Te-Un/Technology-Pollution-Prevention.html [https://perma.cc/XQ36-HCVH]
(last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
40 Statutes requiring that agencies manage natural resources need science-based
information about the status of the natural resources to be protected. See, e.g., Ctr. for
Biological Diversity v. Zinke, 900 F.3d 1053, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2018) (concluding that the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) acted in an arbitrary and capricious
manner by ignoring available scientific biological data showing that the Arctic grayling
population was declining, contrary to the Endangered Species Act requirement that the
FWS base decisions on the “best scientific . . . data available” according to 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533 (b)(1)(A)).
41 Angelo, supra note 31, at 1528–29, 1534, 1541.
42 Roger A. Pielke, Jr., When Scientists Politicize Science: Making Sense of Controversy
over The Skeptical Environmentalist, 7 ENVTL. SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 405, 405–06, 415 (2004).
43 See Carol M. Rose, Environmental Law Grows Up (More or Less), and What Science
Can Do to Help, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 273, 282–86 (2005).
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larger public good.44 Science has been characterized as being “ill-suited”
for policy-making because science emphasizes understanding the workings
of the physical and natural world.45 But it is policy that then takes this
knowledge and tries to fashion rules which accomplish goals benefitting
humans.46 Some commentators have proposed that science and policy be
formally separated in environmental decision-making by requiring that
policymakers expressly distinguish between science-derived information
and facts, and policy-laden assumptions, values, and inferences.47
Although utilitarian science can play a useful role in the develop-
ment of environmental policy, it does contain one significant limitation—
there is uncertainty inherent in science. This uncertainty means that
science often cannot provide definitive answers to the questions that
environmental policymakers ask.48 There are many reasons for this un-
certainty. There may be a lack of reliable data, conflicts in how scientists
interpret data, or inconsistent data.49 Uncertainties may also occur be-
cause of the large number of complex variables that are present in envi-
ronmental systems, as well as the dynamic changes that take place with
those variables.50
This uncertainty creates frustration among policymakers, who
crave certainty and fear political backlash if policy is too ambiguous.51
Uncertainty also engenders criticism of, and skepticism about, scientific
conclusions; those who disagree with what science finds may simply label
it the result of “junk” or “bad” science.52 This discounting of science can
44 STEVEN GOLDBERG & LAWRENCE GOSTIN, LAW AND SCIENCE 1, 3, 5 (2006).
45 See J.B. Ruhl, Reconstructing the Wall of Virtue: Maxims for the Co-Evolution of Envi-
ronmental Law and Environmental Science, 37 ENVTL. L. 1063, 1075 (2007).
46 Id.; ROGER PIELKE, JR., THE HONEST BROKER: MAKING SENSE OF SCIENCE IN POLICY AND
POLITICS 137 (2007).
47 J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, In Defense of Regulatory Peer Review, 84 WASH. U. L. REV.
1, 43–47 (2006).
48 Wendy Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to Produce
Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1624 (2004).
49 Doremus, supra note 37, at 438–39.
50 Naomi Oreskes, Evaluation (Not Validation) of Quantitative Models, 106 ENVTL. HEALTH
PERSP. 1453, 1455 (1998) (stating that the inherent uncertainty in natural systems makes
it impossible to demonstrate predictive reliability of a complex natural system).
51 Usha Varanasi, Making Science Useful in Complex Political and Legal Arenas: A Case
for Frontloading Science in Anticipation of Environmental Changes to Support Natural
Resource Laws and Policies, 3 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 238, 242 (2013).
52 Wendy Wagner, The “Bad Science” Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate Over the Role of Sci-
ence in Public Health and Environmental Regulation, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 68–69
(Fall 2003).
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become a tool for partisan challenges to environmental agency regula-
tions.53 Sometimes accusations of “bad” science become so pronounced
that policymakers simply reject utilitarian science altogether and declare
“war on science.”54
While utilitarian science can help inform the decisions of policy-
makers crafting environmental policy, it can also exacerbate existing
political conflicts over environmental rules.55 Indeed, one effective way
of undermining environmental policy decisions is to allege that the sup-
porting scientific facts are flawed or uncertain.56 These limitations of
utilitarian science have incentivized some commentators to suggest that
another version of science might be better suited to achieving consensus
about relevant environmental policy goals—explanatory science.57 This
science posits explanatory theories and models that can do more than
just inform decisions that result in policy; explanatory science can either
influence policy, or, as this Article argues, direct policy.
B. Explanatory Science
Utilitarian science seeks to provide data and facts about environ-
mental contaminants and natural organisms to assist the decision-making
of those who make environmental policy.58 Explanatory science uses various
scientific “theories” to explain human and natural systems so that this un-
derstanding of reality may either influence or even direct environmental
53 David Adelman, The Art of the Unsolvable: Locating the Vital Center of Science for
Environmental Law and Policy, 37 ENVTL. L. 935, 937 (2007).
54 Juliet Eilperin, Josh Dawsey & Brady Dennis, White House to set up panel to counter
climate change consensus, officials say, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2019), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/national/health-science/white-house-to-select-federal-scientists-to-reassess
-government-climate-findings-sources-say/2019/02/24/49cd0a84-37dd-11e9-af5b-b51b
7ff322e9_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_source=reddit.com&utm_term=.18c569fcde1f
[https://perma.cc/BU8L-BZGP]; Caroline Orr, Trump’s anti-science agenda exodus from the
EPA, AM. INDEP. (Sept. 11, 2018), http://www.americanindependent.com/trumps-anti-sci
ence-agenda-is-driving-a-mass-exodus-from-the-epa/ [https://perma.cc/B9WU-2ZJV]; Edi-
torial, The Trump Administration’s War on Science, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/03/27/opinion/the-trump-administrations-war-on-science.html
[https://perma.cc/2AUG-96BK].
55 THOMAS O. MCGARITY & WENDY E. WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE: HOW SPECIAL INTER-
ESTS CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH 1 (2008); Daniel Sarewitz, How Science Makes
Environmental Controversies Worse, 7 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 385, 386 (2004).
56 RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS: REGULATION AND THE DISTORTION OF SCIENTIFIC
RESEARCH 25–26 (Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor eds., 2006).
57 Biber, supra note 7, at 512–13.
58 Angelo, supra note 31, at 1529.
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policy-making.59 Several scientific theories have been advanced to help
design and implement environmental policy instruments. Complexity the-
ory has emerged as a possible new paradigm for explaining the natural
systems sought to be addressed by environmental policy.60 Complexity
theory has perhaps been most influential among environmental legal
scholars wishing to advance a theory that can describe the workings of
nature and affect environmental policy-making.61 Commentators have
also proposed that game theory,62 systems theory,63 emergy theory,64 and
even “simplicity” theory65 be deployed as scientific explanatory methodol-
ogies to transform environmental policy-making.
Environmental law research has focused on how best to design
environmental policy instruments consistent with complexity theory,66
especially after it became apparent that natural biological and ecological
systems were complex, adaptive systems.67 Professor J. B. Ruhl has argued
that the problems plaguing the environmental regulatory structure can
be best addressed by assuming that the law-and-society system itself is
a complex adaptive system, and complexity theory should be used to
produce strategies for regulatory reform.68 Ruhl and others justify their
proposals for environmental policy reform with complexity theory’s unify-
ing principles, such as the need for environmental laws to become more
adaptive and resilient in the face of perpetual environmental change.69
59 Ruhl, Complexity Theory, supra note 18, at 65.
60 Macintosh & Wilkinson, supra note 17, at 65.
61 Daniel Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and Environmental
Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 145, 147, 156 (2003); J.B. Ruhl & Daniel Martin Katz,
Measuring, Monitoring, and Managing Legal Complexity, 101 IOWA L. REV. 191, 206 (2015).
62 William Dutton, The Ecology of Games and its Enemies, 5 COMM. THEORY 379, 379 (1995).
63 Thomas E. Webb, Exploring System Boundaries, 24 L. CRITIQUE 131, 131–32, 149 (2013).
64 Mary Jane Angelo & Mark T. Brown, Incorporating Emergy Synthesis into Environ-
mental Law: An Integration of Ecology, Economics, and Law, 37 ENVTL. L. 963, 963 (2007).
65  RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 21 (1995); Peter L. Strauss
& Cass Sunstein, The Virtues of Simplicity, YALE L.J. FORUM (Sept. 26, 2006), https://
www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/a-debate-between-peter-strauss-and-cass-sunstein
[https://perma.cc/P5G5-UJW9].
66 Macintosh & Wilkinson, supra note 17, at 67.
67 See infra Section III.A.1.
68 J.B. Ruhl & Harold J. Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of the Law in Modern Administrative States:
Using Complexity Theory to Reveal the Diminishing Returns and Increasing Risks the
Burgeoning of Law Poses to Society, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 403, 407–08 (1997); J.B. Ruhl,
Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean Up the
Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 101, 104 (1997).
69 ROBERT GEYER & SAMIR RIHANI, COMPLEXITY AND PUBLIC POLICY, A NEW APPROACH TO
21ST CENTURY POLITICS 5–6 (2010); Jeffrey Rudd, J.B. Ruhl’s “Law-and-Society System”:
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Another form of explanatory science is game theory, which sees the
design of public policy concerning the environment as a complex game.70
There are multiple players subject to dynamic socioeconomic and institu-
tional factors who compete, cooperate, or defect in different ways to achieve
their objectives.71 Environmental policy often establishes the rules that
govern the game, as well as the norms that guide behavior and the bound-
aries within which the game is played.72 Game theory can not only explain
how this game is played; it can also help shape, and sometimes determine,
the outcome of the game.73
Consider the environmental “game” popularized by Garrett Hardin
and his warning about “The Tragedy of the Commons.”74 Two mountain
goat herders share unregulated open-access common area where their
goats can graze.75 But if they graze too many goats there, exceeding the
area’s carrying capacity, the commons will collapse and the goats will
starve.76 If the two herders determine the area’s carrying capacity, and
both abide by an agreement to limit their goats’ grazing consistent with
this deal, then both are better off.77 But if one herder secretly “defects”
from the agreement, there is a possibility that one herder, or both, will be
worse off.78 The game theory question is: How to prevent defection from
the agreement?79
Burying Norms and Democracy Under Complexity Theory’s Foundation, 29 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 551, 552–55 (2005); J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity
Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and its Practical Meaning of Democracy,
49 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1415 (1996); J.B. Ruhl & Robert Fischman, Adaptive Management
in the Courts, 95 MINN. L. REV. 424, 424 (2010). See also Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity
Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 913, 918 (2005) (“Complexity
theory studies complex adaptive systems [in the environment] and asserts not only that
they can reflect nonlinear properties, but that such properties can also play an essential
role in the sustainability and success of some of these systems.”).
70 Dutton, supra note 62, at 379.
71 Mark Lubell, Governing Institutional Complexity: The Ecology of Game Framework, 41
POL’Y STUD. J. 537, 538–42 (2013).
72 See generally Environmental Policy in the United States, BALLOTPEDIA (2019), https://bal
lotpedia.org/Environmental_policy_in_the_United_States [https://perma.cc/L7QV-CU9L].
73 See Lubell, supra note 71, at 538, 541–42; DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND
THE LAW 1, 1 (1994).
74 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968).
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 1247.
78 See id.
79 See id.
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The standard policy solution is to create an administrative agency
that will always detect and punish defectors, in a top-down display of an
external authority vested with law-based power that imposes rules.80
However, game theorists suggest a potentially better policy, a less costly
and more efficient “bottom-up” strategy—cooperation.81 In an otherwise
non-cooperative resources game involving two or more players, such as
the two goat herders, if the players coordinate their strategies with each
other, each will receive the highest payoff.82 This insight is known as the
Nash equilibrium concept, which provides a way of predicting what will
happen if several people or institutions are making decisions at the same
time and the outcome for each of them depends on the others.83 While one
cannot predict the result of the choices of multiple decision-makers in iso-
lation, one can determine the best outcome for each player if each player
takes action after knowing about and taking into account the decision-
making of the others.84 This outcome can be achieved only if the players
coordinate strategies and cooperate.85 Insights from the explanatory science
of game theory suggest that environmental strategies can be developed
to secure the benefits of cooperation between policy-making agencies and
those subject to the policies made.86
Explanatory science can do more than just “inform” policy decisions.
Explanatory science can tell us whether an environmental law is likely to
work, and whether the outcome is good as a matter of policy.87 In Part IV,
this Article will argue that explanatory science has revealed the Principle
of Universality, which should direct environmental policy in the future.
II. UTILITARIAN SCIENCE INFORMS DECISIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS
Classical utilitarian science helped the evolution of environmental
law between 1965 and the twenty-first century by providing models
80 ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION 8–10 (1990).
81 Id. at 1–15, 36, 42–45.
82 Id. at 15.
83 ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 85, 89 (1984); Mark Schneider &
Jonathan W. Leland, Reference Dependence, Cooperation, and Coordination in Games,
10 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 123, 123 (2015).
84 See Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and Global
Environmental Change, 20 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 550, 551 (2010).
85 See AXELROD, supra note 83, at 85, 89; Ostrom, supra note 84, at 551–52.
86 Hornstein, supra note 69, at 959–60.
87 Id.; RAGHURAM RAJAN, THE THIRD PILLAR: HOW MARKETS AND THE STATE LEAVE THE
COMMUNITY BEHIND (2019).
2019] HOW SCIENCE HAS INFLUENCED ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 771
explaining the behavior of both nature and humans. These science-based
models have been embraced by policymakers, who created legal systems
designed to protect humans from pollution and hazardous wastes and re-
store environmental quality. The resulting environmental laws abandoned
common law solutions, adopted centralized “top-down” command and
prohibition rules, and experimented with decentralized nonregulatory,
market-based approaches.
A. The Prevailing Twentieth-Century Views of Science About
Nature and Humans
1. The Nature of Nature
Throughout much of the twentieth century, the observable world,
including the environmental world, was thought to be governed by de-
terministic rules.88 These rules were postulated by Isaac Newton, René
Descartes, Pierre-Simon Laplace, and Francis Bacon.89 These scientists
understood the world by adopting a mechanistic, “clockwork” universe view,
where prediction and reliability were the norm, and deterministic laws
of cause-and-effect permitted humans to understand the basic workings
of nature and the environment.90 Consistent with this view is the notion
that change happens as a result of some external influence.91 The logical
outgrowth of this assumption is that change is something that humans
do: humans are the best change agents.
Utilitarian science espoused a parallel view of ecosystems and
other natural systems. The prevailing conception of nature through much
of the twentieth century was the idea of “natural balance.”92 This model
supposed that, if left alone, equilibria would exist and populations of plants,
animals, and other living organisms would remain close to them.93 Dis-
turbances to nature were an external and undesirable phenomenon that
interfered with the progress of natural communities toward a stable,
predictable, balanced state.94 Similarly, science embraced the concept of
88 Mark A. Stone, Chaos, Prediction and Laplacean Determinism, 26 AM. PHIL. Q. 123,
123 (1989).
89 Id.
90 LENNY SMITH, CHAOS: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 3 (2007).
91 See Stone, supra note 88, at 124, 126.
92 Frederic E. Clements, Nature and Structure of the Climax, 24 J. ECOLOGY 252, 255–56
(1936).
93 Id.
94 Id.
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“stationarity”—“the idea that natural systems fluctuate within an un-
changing envelope of variability.”95 In other words, the thinking was that
there is some kind of a mythical “natural baseline,” and that the Earth
system is a closely integrated, self-correcting system, where life regulates
the planet’s environment to keep stable.96 Natural feedbacks and control
loops stabilize conditions, eventually bringing about homeostasis.97
How did humans see their place in nature? First, throughout much
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, humans saw themselves as in-
dependent and separate from their natural environmental surroundings.98
Our “environment” was separate from, and exogenous to, humans.99 Sec-
ond, we viewed ourselves as superior to nature, because of a faith in human
exceptionalism.100 The rules governing the rest of the natural world did
not apply to us, as we were an exceptional species.101
These science-based perceptions about nature and humans “outside”
of nature affected environmental policy. On one hand, nature was seen
as a resource to be used by humans to support consumptive lifestyles.102
Natural sinks, like the atmosphere, water, and land, were a free deposi-
tory of our wastes; minerals, rangeland, and forests were economic goods
to be tamed, owned, and exploited as valuable commodities.103 On the
other hand, since humans were apart from nature, they saw their role as
policymakers who could “protect” the environment, cure various environ-
mental “harms,” and bring damaged ecosystems back to a more normal
“natural” state.104 Humans believed they could, with their laws, manage
95 P.C.D. Milly et al., Stationarity is Dead: Whither Water Management?, 319 SCI. 573,
573 (2008).
96 A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Environmental Rule of Law Litigation, 17 PACE ENVTL.
L. REV. 237, 243 (2000).
97 JAMES LOVELOCK, GAIA: A NEW LOOK AT LIFE ON EARTH 10 (2000).
98 See EMILIO F. MORAN, PEOPLE AND NATURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO HUMAN ECOLOGICAL
RELATIONS 35–39 (2d ed. 2017) (describing the evolution of the study of human ecological
relations).
99 Id.
100 CORMAC CULLINAN, WILD LAW: A MANIFESTO FOR EARTH JUSTICE 44–46 (2d ed. 2011);
Jonathan Baert Wiener, Beyond the Balance of Nature, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1,
3–4 (1996).
101 CULLINAN, supra note 100, at 44–46, 51; Wiener, supra note 100, at 3–4.
102 See Humanity’s Voracious Consumption of Natural Resources Unsustainable—UN Re-
port, UN NEWS (May 12, 2011), https://news.un.org/en/story/2011/05/374942 [https://perma
.cc/X57P-G3XF].
103 CULLINAN, supra note 100, at 31, 63, 139–41; Judith Koons, What is Earth Jurispru-
dence: Key Principles to Transform Law for the Health of the Planet, 18 PENN ST. ENVTL.
L. REV. 47, 61–62 (2009).
104 See, e.g., Robinson Meyer, How the U.S. Protects the Environment, From Nixon to Trump,
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natural resources and their surrounding environment, so as to dominate
nature and control it for anthropocentric ends.105 Our sense of superiority
and exceptionalism meant that if the environment was damaged, we could
reverse these human-induced changes with legal rules and restore the
natural baseline. If humans threatened nature, we could enact environ-
mental statutes to preserve and protect vulnerable places and objects.106
2. The Nature of Humans
Standard economic theory has for centuries relied on a model of
human behavior based on rational choice theory, a theory which under-
scores most environmental policy. The “science” of rational choice presumes
that humans act rationally when making choices, usually by balancing
costs against benefits to maximize personal advantage.107 This scientific
view of human behavior is sometimes termed the homo economicus model,
where humans base their choices on their own “utility functions.”108 Homo
economicus ignores social (e.g., environmental) values if they do not pro-
vide individual utility.109
This model of human behavior presumes that natural resources
and environmental goods will be managed, owned, and used to maximize
private, self-interested utility.110 Such resource users explicitly or implicitly
weigh present values against expected future benefits while discounting
future expected costs.111 In other words, when exploiting environmental
goods and natural resources, users tend to adopt a higher discount rate,
which favors current use and consumption over longer-term investments
and conservation.112
THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/03/how
-the-epa-and-us-environmental-law-works-a-civics-guide-pruitt-trump/521001/ [https://
perma.cc/B89S-RFFA].
105 Jedediah Purdy, American Natures: The Shape of Conflict in Environmental Law, 36
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 169, 189–97 (2012).
106 Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five Prin-
ciples for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 31–35 (2010).
107 JON ELSTER, NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 29 (1989).
108 GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 3–6 (1976).
109 DANIEL COHEN, HOMO ECONOMICUS: THE (LOST) PROPHET OF MODERN TIMES 12 (2014);
ELSTER, supra note 107, at 13, 16, 29.
110 TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM 5 (rev. ed.
1991).
111 DANIEL H. COLE, POLLUTION AND PROPERTY: COMPARING OWNERSHIP INSTITUTIONS FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 89 (2002).
112 See id.
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A convergence of two beliefs thereby elevated resource use and
environmental pollution over collective stewardship and protection of
environmental goods and systems. First, nature was seen as a limitless
array of raw commodities to be exploited and developed to benefit hu-
mans. Nature and the environment became commodified; they belonged
to humans.113
Second, faith in economic growth meant that the natural world
surrounding humans—oceans, rivers, the atmosphere, land, trees—was
seen as a means of achieving human-centric ends, such as personal health,
carbon-based energy use, and competitive market advantage.114 As a re-
sult, the natural world became overused, and environmental goods (air,
water, lands) became degraded and polluted.115
There were other negative effects of these human choices. Because
resource users wished to use resources before someone else “captured”
the economic potential locked in a particular natural resource, there was
a race to fish, harvest, mine, graze, and appropriate before some other user
did.116 This tendency was particularly strong when there was an open
access commons.117 There was a realization that market prices did not
incorporate all relevant values, such as the costs not captured in prices
when there was a negative externality associated with an activity (e.g.,
when there was unpriced pollution or waste disposal).118 These market
failures, along with the problem of collective goods and free riders,119
eventually helped policymakers realize that laws and legal institutions
needed to be implemented. Environmental law was born.
B. Prevailing Legal Systems
Before there was “environmental law,” private remedies could be
sought to compensate for private harms caused by environmental pollution.
113 JAN LAITOS & JULIANA OKULSKI, WHY ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES FAIL 2 (2017).
114 See GAR ALPEROVITZ, AMERICA BEYOND CAPITALISM: RECLAIMING OUR WEALTH, OUR
LIBERTY, AND OUR DEMOCRACY 143–44 (2005).
115 See ELIZABETH KOLBERT, FIELD NOTES FROM A CATASTROPHE: MAN, NATURE, AND
CLIMATE CHANGE 183 (2006).
116 See JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE
LUMBER INDUSTRY IN WISCONSIN, 1836–1915 105, 127, 435 (1964).
117 See Hardin, supra note 74, at 1244.
118 Thomas Helbling, Externalities: Prices Do Not Capture All Costs, INT’L MONETARY FUND
(Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/external.htm [https://
perma.cc/8L8X-CLE6].
119 For a definition of this term, see Will Kenton, Free Rider Problem, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 12,
2018), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/free_rider_problem.asp [https://perma.cc
/BJ59-LPSG].
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The pollution was typically human-caused pollution of the air and water.120
These remedies involved traditional common law causes of action, such
as nuisance and trespass.121 The common law, however, is an imperfect
and costly mechanism for resolving complex environmental disputes. It
is often prohibitively expensive (or impossible) to discover who, or what,
is causing the problem.122 Additionally, when it is not in the interest of
a single plaintiff to bring suit, there are problems involved in arranging
joint actions from parties adversely affected.123 Finally, any permanent
common law remedy risks putting out of business polluting employers
and economic drivers of communities, whose continued existence is often
critical to the social welfare of an impacted area.124
It is because common law remedies were, and are, perceived to be
inefficient mechanisms for resolving environmental problems that the
new field of environmental law turned to statutes and regulations.125 These
laws were designed to prevent, rather than to compensate for, the human
and environmental harms caused by pollution and waste disposal.126 En-
vironmental policymakers sought to limit such harms by imposing central-
ized command, control, and prohibitory rules.127 Utilitarian science helped
to inform the decisions behind these rules.
1. Centralized Environmental Regulation
The modern era of environmental regulation began in the late 1960s
and continued through the 1980s.128 During this time, Congress passed
environmental law statutes, based on environmental standards, which
operate by seeking to prevent harm to humans and the environment.129
120 JAN G. LAITOS, A LEGAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF AIR POLLUTION CONTROLS 4 (1980);
EARL FINBAR MURPHY, WATER PURITY: A STUDY IN LEGAL CONTROL OF NATURAL RESOURCES
6–7 (1961).
121 Jan G. Laitos, Legal Institutions and Pollution: Some Intersections Between Law and
History, 15 NAT. RES. J. 423, 424, 447 (1975).
122 Id. at 438–39.
123 Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems and
Class Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 74–75 (2007).
124 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15–16 (1960).
125 Richard A. Epstein, From Common Law to Environmental Protection: How the Modern
Environmental Movement has Lost its Way, 23 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 141, 143 (2015).
126 Houck, supra note 5, at 164.
127 See id. at 165.
128 W. Kepner, EPA and a Brief History of Environmental Law in the United States, EPA
(June 15, 2016), https://cfpub.epa.gov/si/si_public_record_report.cfm?Lab=NERL&dirEn
tryId=319430 [https://perma.cc/A49R-82PM].
129 See supra notes 32, 34 and 36. See infra note 131.
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These standards were established on the basis of utilitarian scientific
analysis. For example, in the 1970 Clean Air Act, National Ambient Air
Quality Standards for “criteria pollutants,” like carbon monoxide and sulfur
dioxide, required those standards to have “an ‘adequate’ margin of safety”
to protect the health of even the most sensitive human populations with-
out regard to cost.130 That decision was “informed” by science; utilitarian
science would decide what standard was safe for human health.
Similarly, environmental statutes addressing toxicity were based
on determinations of “unreasonable risk” to human health in the environ-
ment.131 Utilitarian science was used to determine what levels of a toxic
substance posed a risk to human health.132 Statutes governing cleanups
of hazardous waste had to decide when the removal of the dumped waste
was acceptable and adequate.133 Again, utilitarian science informed the
determination of “how clean is clean.” The calibration of levels of environ-
mental harm, as well as degrees of safety, was the job of science.
These statutes relied on centralized administrative regulatory
agencies, like the federal Environmental Protection Agency, to issue either
outright bans on certain substances or activities affecting environmental
goods134 or command-and-control regulations. Environmental and natural
resources laws that relied on heavy-handed, top-down controls presumed
that their science-based rules and standards would result in predictable
outcomes.135 Both scientists and environmental policymakers held the
view that the natural superiority of humans permitted them to “manage”
earth-based environmental systems.136
Science also affected the views of policymakers about whether
anthropogenic changes to the natural world were normal and acceptable,
or harmful and abnormal.137 The prevailing scientific presumption was
130 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assoc., 531 U.S. 457, 465 (2001).
131 See the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136(x)–(bb)
(2012); TSCA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2692 (1976); the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 300f (2012).
132 Houck, supra note 5, at 167–68.
133 See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9628 (2012).
134 See, e.g., the ban on the pesticide DDT, or on the addition of lead in gasoline. Herbert
L. Needleman, The Removal of Lead from Gasoline: Historical and Personal Reflections,
84 ENVTL. RESEARCH SEC. A 20, 28 (2000).
135 C.S. Holling & G.K. Meffe, Command and Control and the Pathology of Natural Re-
sources Management, 10 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 328, 329–30 (1996).
136 EVAN EISENBERG, THE ECOLOGY OF EDEN 286–88 (1998).
137 PEW RESEARCH CTR., 1. Public Views on Climate Change and Climate Scientists (Oct. 4,
2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/science/2016/10/04/public-views-on-climate-change
-and-climate-scientists/ [https://perma.cc/9GZY-QFSF].
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(and to a certain extent, still is) that human changes were per se harmful
because humans upset the “balance of nature.”138 If anthropogenic change
is degrading and unnatural, then environmental and natural resources
regulation should try to reverse human-induced changes, to bring ecosys-
tems and environmental conditions back to a more “natural” baseline.139
The goal of environmental and natural resources regulation should thereby
be preservation and restoration.140
2. Decentralized Environmental Legal Systems
Commentators reviewing centralized command-and-control en-
vironmental law regimes began to criticize them as being inherently in-
efficient, producing more social costs than benefits.141 Instead of relying
on top-down, centralized hierarchical environmental regulation, legal
scholars and scientists suggested that environmental policy embrace more
decentralized, flexible, and consensual legal instruments.142 Their recom-
mendations favored three types of decentralized, efficiency-enhancing,
environmental law systems: (1) tradeable permitting and effluent taxa-
tion; (2) the creation of individual “rights” to a clean environment; and
(3) enhanced use of conservation easements and land trusts.143
a. Transferable Pollution or Resource Rights, and Pollution Taxes
As soon as traditional command-and-control systems were in place,
economists and legal commentators began to advocate for more cost-
effective alternatives that relied on market dynamics.144 Such a system
could be used for air or water basins contaminated by pollution, or for
open-access commons, like fisheries or rangelands.145 A legal regime of
138 DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 9, 12–13 (1990).
139 Richard J. Hobbs & Viki A. Cramer, Restoration Ecology: Interventionist Approaches
for Restoring and Maintaining Ecosystem Function in the Face of Rapid Environmental
Change, 33 ANN. REV. ENV’T & RES. 39, 40, 50–51 (2008).
140 Craig, supra note 106, at 31–35.
141 Richard B. Stewart, United States Environmental Regulation: A Failing Paradigm,
15 J.L. & COM. 585, 587 (1996); T.H. Tietenberg, Economic Instruments for Environmental
Regulation, 6 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 17, 23 (1990).
142 Stewart, supra note 141, at 589–91.
143 Id. at 591–93; Dinah L. Shelton, Developing Substantive Environmental Rights, 1 J.
HUMAN RTS. & ENV’T 89, 118–20 (2010).
144 J.H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY, AND PRICES: AN ESSAY IN POLICY-MAKING AND
ECONOMICS 99 (1968).
145 See id. at 88–89.
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transferable pollution or resource rights would, in theory, permit the gov-
ernment to reduce the costs of achieving science-based pollution reduc-
tion and resource conservation goals.146 The government sets the pollution
or sustainable resource goal, and determines the amount of allowable
emissions, or reduction in use of a declining resource, that science assumes
will obtain the goal.147 The government then unitizes and allocates the
allowable emissions or resource rights, in the form of transferable rights,
among regulated persons or firms.148 Transferability among those regu-
lated ensures the smallest aggregate compliance or abatement cost by cre-
ating markets that efficiently allocate the costs among those regulated.149
Whereas a centralized government regulator displaces the market
as a resource allocation mechanism, a system of individual transferable
use quotas relies on market dynamics to produce allocative efficiencies and
deter resource overuse.150 Transferable rights have been implemented or
proposed for a number of unowned “commons” or “open-access” resource
problems. These include pollution of the atmosphere,151 pollution of water
reservoirs,152 exploitation of fisheries,153 overgrazing of rangeland,154 and
overused wilderness areas.155 With the advent of climate change, scholars
again argued that tradeable permit markets may be a useful model for
environmental policymakers to adopt.156
Effluent or pollution taxes are also, in theory, more efficient than
command-and-control regulations. Some centralized government author-
ity does not tell polluters how much pollution they may release, but only
requires them to pay a tax for each unit of pollution spewed into the
146 See id. at 35.
147 Id. at 100.
148 Id. at 81.
149 Id. at 83; COLE, supra note 111, at 46–47.
150 See Oran R. Young, Institutional Interplay: The Environmental Consequences of Cross-
Scale Interactions, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS 267 (Elinor Ostrom et al. eds., 2002).
151 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b) (2012).
152 Robert W. Hahn & Gordon Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and Practice,
16 ECOLOGY L. Q. 361, 391–96 (1989).
153 Katrina Miriam Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution of Private Prop-
erty, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117, 164 (2005).
154 Robert H. Nelson, How to Reform Grazing Policy: Creating Forage Rights on Federal
Rangelands, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 645, 647–48 (1997).
155 Jan Laitos & Rachel Gamble, The Problem with Wilderness, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
503, 533 (2008).
156 THOMAS ARONSSON, KENNETH BUCKLUND, & KARL-GUSTAF LOFGREN, ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY, SUSTAINABILITY AND WELFARE: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 31 (2018); MATTHIAS
RUTH, ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 117 (2018).
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environment.157 This system permits those that pollute to individually
select levels of emissions, or emission reductions, based on each polluter’s
differential costs of controlling the pollution.158 The decentralized deci-
sion to pollute, or to reduce levels of pollution, is up to the polluter, not
some centralized policymaker.159 The advantages and efficiencies of a tax
on emissions has made carbon-based pricing and carbon taxes a popular
market-based policy instrument to address climate change challenges.160
b. Individual Rights to a Clean Environment
Another decentralized alternative to top-down command-and-control
rules is the acknowledgment or creation of a legal “right,” held by indi-
viduals, to a “clean” (and usually also a “healthy”) environment. An early
recognition of such a right came in the Stockholm Declaration, which
emerged from a global eco-summit in 1972.161 Since then, most United
Nations member countries recognize a right “to protect and improve the
environment for present and future generations.”162 In the United States,
several states have added environmental bills of rights to state constitu-
tions.163 For these states, an often-litigated issue is whether these state
constitutional provisions provide people or organizations with “liberty”
or “property” interests under the Due Process Clause.164
157 COLE, supra note 111, at 70.
158 Stewart, supra note 141, at 592.
159 COLE, supra note 111, at 70.
160 SHI-LING HSU, THE CASE FOR A CARBON TAX 5–6, 15–16 (2011); INNOVATION AD-
DRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE CHALLENGES: MARKET-BASED PERSPECTIVES (M. Hymel et al.
eds., 2018).
161 Lynda Collins, The United Nations, Human Rights and the Environment, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 229 (Anna Grear & Louis J. Kotze
eds., 2015).
162 Id. David R. Boyd, The Constitutional Right to a Healthy Environment, 54 ENV’T: SCI.
& POL’Y SUSTAINABLE DEV. 3, 4 (2012); Margherita Pieraccini, Reflections on the Relation-
ship Between Environmental Regulation, Human Rights and Beyond—with Heidegger,
in THOUGHT, LAW, RIGHTS AND ACTION IN THE AGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 87 (Anna
Grear & Evadne Grant eds., 2015).
163 Audrey Wall, State Constitutions and Environmental Bills of Rights, COUNCIL ST.
GOV’TS (Sept. 1, 2015), http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/state-constitutions-and
-environmental-bills-rights [https://perma.cc/2UH9-8HB4].
164 Compare Del. Riverkeeper Network v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n., 895 F.3d 102, 108 (D.C.
Cir. 2018) (holding that plaintiffs did not have a property or liberty interest under a Penn-
sylvania environmental law), with In re Application of Maui Elec. Co., 408 P.3d (Haw. 2017)
(holding that plaintiffs did have a property interest in a clean and healthy environment).
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c. Conservation Easements and Land Trusts
Another decentralized environmental protection and preservation
tool relies on private owners of undeveloped land. Should those owners
wish to preserve wild lands, they may convey a conservation easement—
a right to prevent resource development—to a public or private land
trust.165 The owner only conveys a part of the total interest in the land—
the right to develop it.166 And when the donation is perpetual, it may qualify
as a deductible gift for federal tax purposes.167 Some scholars wish to go
beyond land trusts and alter the extent of the public trust doctrine. They
argue that the doctrine should be broadened to compel government, as
the trustee of public environmental goods, to protect air and water for
humanity—the beneficiaries of the trust.168
III. EXPLANATORY SCIENCE INFLUENCES POLICY
By the twenty-first century, we began to realize that, despite
decades of environmental laws and established environmental policies,
humans were continuing to adversely influence Earth’s environmental sys-
tems. There were three manifestations of this anthropogenic effect on the
environment. First, it became largely accepted among scientists that we
have entered a new, post-Holocene epoch, called the “Anthropocene.”169
This new era marks the first time in the Earth’s history when changes
in Earth systems, from climate change to ocean acidification to species
extinction, are due to anthropogenic actions.170 Second, scientists increas-
ingly accepted the concept of “Planetary Boundaries” which provide a
“safe operating space for humanity.”171 The consensus among scientists
was that anthropogenic actions were pushing certain critical Earth sys-
tems outside of this safe place, such that human life on Earth may no
165 TOM DANIELS & DEBORAH BOWERS, HOLDING OUR GROUND: PROTECTING AMERICA’S
FARMS AND FARMLAND 201 (1997).
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST 147 (2013).
169 Paul J. Crutzen, Geology of Mankind, 415 NATURE 23, 23 (2002).
170 Damian Carrington, The Anthropocene epoch: scientists declare dawn of human-influenced
age, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/aug
/29/declare-anthropocene-epoch-experts-urge-geological-congress-human-impact-earth
[https://perma.cc/N2PV-HMVZ].
171 Johan Rockstrom et al., A Safe Operating Space for Humanity, 461 NATURE 472, 472
(2009).
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longer be sustainable.172 Third, scientific researchers began to see steep-
ening trends since the 1960s (when environmental law was “invented”)
toward intensified use of Earth’s natural resources and higher levels of
pollution.173 They termed this alarming speeding up of anthropogenic
environmental change “The Great Acceleration.”174
These depressing realizations helped to bring about a change in
our view of the role of utilitarian science. Commentators and scholars
began to doubt our faith in scientifically defined environmental limits or in
creative technological capacities as means to avoid negative environmen-
tal consequences of human economic growth.175 While decisions informed
by scientific evidence were, and are, thought to create better outcomes
than irrational, fear-based narratives, utilitarian science alone did not
seem to supply the answers sought by policymakers.176 No amount of sci-
entific evidence informing traditional top-down centralized rules and
standards seemed to be able to solve the greatest environmental challenges
of our time—global climate change, Earth system alterations, more pol-
lution, habitat loss, and extinctions.177
A paradigm change emerged for science and environmental policy,
first suggested by scholars and then slowly embraced by policymakers.178
While science certainly should provide data and evidence to decision-
makers, it was thought that science should also seek to explain how
nature really works, and how humans in fact make choices affecting their
environment.179 Moreover, we began to realize that science can offer ex-
planatory models, or theories, which better connect environmental policies
to the environmental systems subject to those policies. This other version
of science, explanatory science, permits policymakers to devise environ-
mental laws that reflect and are consistent with the reality of both
nature and human behavior. And explanatory science offers theoretical
models of this reality that can help shape and influence policy.
172 Simon L. Lewis, We Must Set Planetary Boundaries Wisely, 485 NATURE 417, 417 (May
2012).
173 Will Steffen et al., The Trajectory of the Anthropocene: The Great Acceleration, 2
ANTHROPOCENE REV. 81, 82 (2015).
174 Id.
175 See Biber, supra note 7, at 512–13.
176 See id.
177 ERLE C. ELLIS, ANTHROPOCENE: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 2–3, 29; Houck, supra note
5, at 171.
178 See ELLIS, supra note 177, at 3.
179 Id. at 29.
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A. Environmental Policies That Conform to Nature’s Reality
1. A More Realistic View of Nature
Throughout much of the twentieth century, the end goal of envi-
ronmental policies was grounded in the twin objects of “stationarity” and
“separateness.” The concept of stationarity reflected the prevailing idea
“that natural systems [usually] fluctuate within an unchanging envelope
of variability.”180 Environmental laws sought either to preserve ecosystems
or to restore environmental resources back to some “natural baseline.”181
Similarly, scientists thought that all of Earth’s living organisms worked
to achieve a state of equilibrium, ensuring that “Gaia’s living system”
would always self-regulate to re-optimize variables for life to persist.182 For
environmental policymakers, this view, along with the concept of separa-
tion between humans and their environment, meant that environmental
laws should minimize or eliminate the destructive impact of human ac-
tions on Earth systems, and that our laws should bring us back to a more
natural and less anthropomorphic state.183
However, in the twenty-first century, explanatory science offered
two theories—chaos theory and complexity theory—which challenged
these beliefs about the nature of nature. Chaos theory is the study of
deterministic natural systems that are non-linear.184 In such a system,
small changes might produce a large change (resulting in a tipping point)
at certain times.185 Complexity theory studies complex systems that are a
special type of chaotic system.186 They are not deterministic, and display
the concepts of emergence and adaptability.187 Emergence is the appear-
ance of patterns arising from the interactions of a system’s components.188
This development of patterns is bottom-up, which means the outcome of
180 Milly et al., supra note 95, at 573.
181 Tarlock, supra note 96, at 243.
182 J.E. LOVELOCK, GAIA: A NEW LOOK AT LIFE ON EARTH 131; ROBERT MACARTHUR & E.O.
WILSON, THE THEORY OF ISLAND BIOGEOGRAPHY 65.
183 Simon Levin et al., Social-Ecological Systems as Complex Adaptive Systems: Modeling
and Policy Implications, 18 ENVTL. & DEV. ECON. 111, 114 (2013).
184 JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: THE MAKING OF A NEW SCIENCE 62–64 (1987) (describing the
relationship between non-linearity and ecology).
185 Id.
186 See Definition of Complexity Theory, COLLINS DICTIONARY (2019), https://www.collins
dictionary.com/dictionary/english/complexity-theory [https://perma.cc/4VUV-H2UZ].
187 DAVID BYRNE, COMPLEXITY THEORY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: AN INTRODUCTION
16–17 (1998).
188 Id. at 47–49.
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the interaction of a system’s components is inherently unpredictable.
Adaptation is a transformative modification of the initial system. Complex
systems display a distinctive type of emergent behavior called “complex
adaptive behavior”—many agents forming, dissolving, reforming, again
and again.189 It is a form of non-linear self-organization that brings about
a higher level of operational complexity, and a change from the starting
point which is not just different in degree, but also different in kind.190
The study of non-linear adaptive and dynamical systems through
the development of chaos and complexity theory helped to break the
Newtonian paradigm of a clockwork universe promising prediction and
reliability.191 Complexity theory has profound implications for traditional
linear understandings of cause-and-effect. A complex system, like an eco-
system, does not conform to a Newtonian world, but rather a world more
aligned with quantum physics.192 Such a quantum world deals with proba-
bilities, not certainties.193 It is a world of potentialities and possibilities,
which rejects causality, and measures Earth’s systems as being in an
ever-changing indeterminate state.194
Coincident with the rise of complexity theory and its embrace of
quantum physics theory has been the emergence of a new standard model
for nature and the environment. The previous model, outlined in Part II,
saw the natural environment as a system that was linear, predictable,
and seeking homeostasis and equilibrium. It also assumed that humans
were separate from, and outside of, their physical environment, which per-
mitted policymakers to “manage” that environment. Explanatory science
rejected this standard model as not realistic for two reasons.
First, nature’s systems are non-linear, unpredictable, and exceed-
ingly difficult to manage by top-down regulations. Nature is characterized
by complex behaviors and physical interactions that emerge as a result
of non-linear spatiotemporal exchanges among component systems and
subsystems that adapt to constant changes in the environment.195 Con-
sistent with complexity theory, the “environment” is best understood as
189 Mustafa Canan & Andres Sousa-Poza, Complex Adaptive Behavior: Pragmatic Idealism
95 PROCEDIA COMPUTER SCIENCE 73–74 (2016).
190 ROGER LEWIN, COMPLEXITY: LIFE AT THE EDGE OF CHAOS 51–53 (Macmillan Publ. Co.
1993).
191 Id. at 11.
192 Id.
193 See id.
194 See ADAM BECKER, WHAT IS REAL? THE UNFINISHED QUEST FOR THE MEANING OF
QUANTUM PHYSICS 14.
195 LEWIN, supra note 190, at 11.
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a “complex adaptive system.”196 If the natural environment acts as a com-
plex adaptive system (“CAS”) in accordance with the rules of complexity
theory,197 then the lesson for environmental policymakers is obvious.
Environmental law needs to be revised to reflect that the ecological and
environmental reality is one of complex, unstable, non-linear, and unpre-
dictable change, where environmental systems are not seeking equilib-
rium or stationarity, but adaptive resilience.198
Second, explanatory science did more than simply explain how the
environment works like a CAS; it also provided a more realistic model of
the relationship between humans and their environmental surroundings.
Humans are not separate and apart from the physical environment.
Rather, humans are an integral part of that environment. Humans, along
with the Earth, natural systems, the biosphere, and environmental goods,
are all part of a unified system, a “social-ecological” system (the “SES”).199
The premise behind the idea of the SES is that there are no natural
systems without people, nor are their anthropocentric social systems with-
out natural systems.200 The SES is interdependent, constantly evolving
like a CAS, and conforming to the key tenets of complexity theory.201
Environmental policymakers cannot ignore the implications of the idea
of the SES. Failure will be the fate of environmental policies grounded
in the belief that humans are in effect puppeteers, able to master and
manipulate natural resources and environmental systems to anthropo-
centric ends. There is no separate human “us” in the SES; humans and
their planet’s biosphere are evolving together.202 Environmental policies
196 C. Folke et al., Resilience Thinking: Integrating Resilience, Adaptability and Trans-
formability, 15 ECOLOGY & SOCIETY 20 (2010); S.A. Levin, Ecosystems and the Biosphere
as Complex Adaptive Systems, 1 ECOSYSTEMS 431 (1998); Wendell Jones, Complex Adaptive
Systems, BEYOND INTRACTABILITY (Oct. 2003), https://www.beyondintractability.org/essay
/complex_adaptive_systems [https://perma.cc/RB7M-PNA7].
197 Aaron Pycroft, Complexity Theory: An Overview, in APPLYING COMPLEXITY THEORY 25
(A. Pycroft & Clemens Bartollas eds. 2014).
198 J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to
Clean Up the Environment Without Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L.
REV. 933, 940–41 (1997).
199 Brian H. Walker et al., Exploring Resilience in Social-Ecological Systems Through Studies
and Theory Development, 11 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 1, 1 (2006).
200 George S. Sessions, Anthropocentrism and the Environmental Crisis, 2 HUMBOLDT J.
SOC. REL. 71, 71 (Fall/Winter 1974).
201 BYRNE, supra note 187, at 93–94. Levin et al., supra note 183.
202 See Jason Bittel, 4 Clever (and Kind of Sad) Ways Animals Adapt to Humans, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 11, 2015), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2015/02/150211
-climate-change-science-animals-adaptation-orangutans-manatees/ [https://perma.cc
/DY6J-DPXL].
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are best directed toward the holistic SES, not just the SES’s “social” or
“ecological” components.203
2. Legal Systems That Reflect the Reality of Nature
After explanatory science began to describe natural and social sys-
tems in light of CAS and SES theories, legal scholars and commentators
began to urge that environmental policy mirror this new scientific “reality.”
Some of these suggestions were adopted as environmental policy, and some
became a part of twenty-first century environmental law.204 For example,
there has been a trend towards more flexible and consensual styles of
governance, instead of top-down, hierarchical command-and-control regula-
tion and prohibition.205 Resource managers realized that such centralized,
authoritative rules, with an attendant belief in predictable outcomes,
worked counter to the characteristics of complex adaptive systems.206 A
CAS, like a forest, relies on non-linear bottom-up dynamics; managers of
forests, rangelands, and ecosystems relied on complexity theory to enhance
the resilience and adaptability of biological systems.207 Even the Paris
Agreement of 2015 shifted from a top-down approach for national govern-
ments in addressing global climate change to a more manageable bottom-
up implementation strategy.208
Commentators have also urged that, in an era where complexity
theory and SES theory have been generally accepted, environmental and
natural resources laws should adjust to a different view of the natural
world.209 Rather than assume “nature” is exogenous to humans, environ-
mental policymakers need to direct their laws to socioecological systems,
203 L. Lebel et al., Governance and the Capacity to Manage Resilience in Regional Social-
Ecological Systems, 11 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 4–5 (2006).
204 See RISK, RESILIENCE, INEQUALITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 129–32 (B. Hutter ed.
2017); DECISION MAKING IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 63–67 (L. Paddock, R. Glicksman & N.
Bryner eds. 2016).
205 Arthur P.J. Mol, Social Theories of Environmental Reform: Towards a Third Generation,
in ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIOLOGY: EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES AND INTERDISCIPLINARY CHAL-
LENGES 25 (M. Gross & H. Heinrichs eds. 2010).
206 See id. at 25–26, 31.
207 See C.R. Drever et al., Can Forest Management Based on Natural Disturbances Maintain
Ecological Resilience?, 36 CANADIAN J. FOREST RES. 2285, 2287, 2291 (2006); C.S. Folke et
al., Regime Shifts, Resilience, and Biodiversity in Ecosystem Management, 35 ANN. REV.
ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 557, 559 (2004).
208 Daniel Esty, Is There Reason for Optimism on Climate Change?, YALE INSIGHTS (Sept. 6,
2018), https://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/is-there-reason-for-optimism-on-climate-change
[https://perma.cc/7QKP-E4LX].
209 Craig, supra note 106, at 36–37; Cormac Cullinan, Do Humans Have Standing to Deny
Trees Rights?, 11 BARRY L. REV. 11, 19–20 (2008).
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which include human societies.210 Indeed, explanatory science describes
the SES in terms of complexity theory, requiring reform of the prevailing
regulatory state.211
These different, but more realistic, perspectives of nature have in-
fluenced policy in three specific ways. First, adoption of complexity theory
has helped to justify and implement “adoptive management” and “ecosys-
tem management” as decision-making methodologies. Second, “emergy
theory” provides a method to more accurately value natural resources and
ecosystem services in a way that captures their inherent value. Third, in
a departure from affording only humans with environmental rights, the
notion of “nature’s rights” has become an alternative bottom-up policy.
a. Adaptive and Ecosystem Management
If the natural environment is centered on the concept of complex
change and subsequent ecological adaptation to change, then environ-
mental laws need to be flexible, requiring an adaptive, iterative manage-
ment decision-making methodology.212 This methodology may be termed
“adaptive management,” which has been described as a policy “that
recognizes uncertainty in its consequences, and seeks to improve under-
standing . . . by learning about management outcomes and incorporating
what is learned into ongoing management.”213 Adaptive management may
be perceived as pragmatic management, in which there is never a fixed
decision by policymakers.214
Adaptive management has been used as a resource management
tool for fisheries and public lands.215 A realization that forests are complex
adaptive systems helped cause silviculturists to shift from managing forests
to be homogenized to maintaining timber heterogeneity and diversity
210 Craig, supra note 106, at 37.
211 J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-Society System:
A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE
L.J. 849, 917 (1996).
212 J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management—Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 21, 28 (2005).
213 LAITOS & OKULSKI, supra note 113, at 115.
214 Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty
Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943, 960 (2003).
215 Robert L. Glicksman, Ecosystem Resilience to Disruptions Linked to Global Climate
Change: An Adaptive Approach to Federal Land Management, 87 NEB. L. REV. 833, 838
(2009); Samuel P. Hays, The Future of Environmental Regulation, 15 J.L. & COM. 549, 579
(1996); John M. Volkman & Willis E. McConnaha, Through a Glass Darkly: Columbia
River Salmon, The Endangered Species Act, and Adaptive Management, 23 ENVTL. L.
1249, 1251, 1255 (1993).
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through adaptive management.216 When silviculturists manage forests as
complex adaptive systems, the forests are better able to respond to a variety
of changes, are more resilient, and become more productive.217 Adaptive
management can also benefit forests by applying complexity theory to the
harvesting of deer in forests in order to blunt the adverse effects of large
deer numbers that voraciously eat all new regenerative growth.218
As explanatory science better understood natural systems to be
CASs, so too did environmental policymakers realize that the dynamic
complexity of these systems meant that environmental strategies needed
to conform to the science of “ecology.” When nature is viewed through the
lens of ecology, living organisms are not considered stable communities
that seek equilibrium and stationarity; rather, they are “ecosystems” that
are dynamic, adaptive, and stochastic.219 Ecosystems are best addressed
within an “ecosystem management” framework, which calls for creative
and adaptive use of policy instruments that reflect complexity theory.220
Ecosystem management acknowledges that virtually all Earth-based en-
vironmental systems are strengthened by biodiversity, which brings about
system sustainability.221
b. Emergy Theory
In addition to complexity theory, explanatory science offered a new
model for valuing natural resources and ecosystems. This methodology is
known as the “emergy” theory of valuation synthesis. Instead of valuing the
worth of environmental goods based on anthropomorphic consumer prefer-
ences, emergy theory argues that the worth of the natural environment
216 M.L. HUNTER, MAINTAINING BIODIVERSITY IN FOREST ECOSYSTEMS 26–27 (1999); M.
LOREAU ET AL., BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM FUNCTIONING: SYNTHESIS AND PERSPEC-
TIVES 240–41 (2002).
217 KLAUS J. PUETTMANN, K. DAVID COATS & CHRISTIAN MESSIER, CRITIQUE OF SILVICUL-
TURE: MANAGING FOR COMPLEXITY 112, 117, 119 (2009).
218 Jason Stein, The Hunt for Answers: Are There Too Many Deer? A U.W. Scientist Says
Reducing the Herd Will Help Our Forests, ON WISCONSIN (Winter 2018), https://onwiscon
sin.uwalumni.com/features/the-hunt-for-answers/ [https://perma.cc/7VYD-7LQQ].
219 S.A. Levin, Ecosystems and the Biosphere as Complex Adaptive Systems, 1 ECOSYS-
TEMS 431, 432 (1998).
220 ALANNA CORTNER & MARGARET MOOTE, THE POLITICS OF ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 1
(1999); S.A. Levin, Self-organization and the Emergence of Complexity in Ecological
Systems, 55 BIOSCIENCE 1075, 1075–76 (2005).
221 S.A. Levin, Multiple Scales and the Maintenance of Biodiversity, 3 ECOSYSTEMS 498, 504
(2000); S.A. Levin, Science and Sustainability, 3 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 545, 545 (1993).
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should be measured on its ecocentric intrinsic value.222 Emergy theory is
useful to environmental policy for two reasons. First, such policy should
facilitate the delivery of certain service functions provided by humans’
environmental surroundings, such as “natural capital” and “ecosystem
services.”223 Second, instead of relying on neoclassical economics to value
ecological resources and services as part of a traditional human-based
cost-benefit analysis, emergy theory points out that the real worth of
nature does not stem only from its utilization by humans.224 The impor-
tance, or “benefit” in a cost-benefit calculation, of ecosystem services and
natural capital is tied to the concepts’ role in permitting and sustaining
life on this planet.225
c. Rights of Nature
The twenty-first century witnessed a growing skepticism about
the ability of traditional environmental laws to deter or reduce anthropo-
morphic actions adversely affecting the SES. Such laws tend to regard
nature as separate from humans, where natural resources and environ-
mental systems are viewed as property, primarily useful as a means to
benefit one species: humans.226 Commentators, and some countries, ad-
vanced the idea that nature, the environment, or natural resources are in
reality a partner with which humanity coevolved in the SES.227 As such,
nature and the natural environment should be acknowledged to have, or
should be given, legal rights.228 Provisions in the positive law of countries
recognizing the rights of nature, sometimes referred to as Earth Juris-
prudence, point toward environmental policy that permits persons and
222 MARK SAGOFF, PRICE, PRINCIPLE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 5 (2004); Mark T. Brown &
Sergio Ulgiati, Emergy Evaluation of the Biosphere and Natural Capital, 28 AMBIO 486,
491–92 (1999).
223 GRETCHEN DALY, NATURE’S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYS-
TEMS 3, 13 (1997); DIETER HELM, NATURAL CAPITAL: VALUING THE PLANET 2, 63 (2015).
224 Mary Jane Angelo & Mark T. Brown, Incorporating Emergy Synthesis into Environ-
mental Law: An Integration of Ecology, Economics, and Law, 37 ENVTL. L. 963, 986 (2007).
225 Id.
226 See UN NEWS, supra note 102.
227 Michael Schoon & Sander van der Leeuw, The Shift Toward Social-Ecological System
Perspectives: Insights Into the Human-Nature Relationship, NATURES SCIENCES SOCIÉTÉS,
23, 167 (2015).
228 JAN LAITOS, THE RIGHT OF NONUSE 122–24 (2012). See Constitución Política de la
República del Ecuador [Ecuador], 20 October 2008, Art. 71 (recognizing the inalienable
rights of nature).
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organizations to represent and assert the legal interests of ecosystems
and environmental goods.229
B. Environmental Policies That Conform to Human Reality
1. A More Realistic View of Human Behavior
Standard neoclassical economic theory for centuries relied on a
model of human behavior based on the homo economicus assumption.230
This assumption underscores most environmental policy.231 It presumes
that individuals act rationally when making choices.232 This “rational
choice” view of human behavior assumes that we act by balancing costs
and benefits to arrive at decisional action that optimizes or maximizes
personal advantage.233 In other words, humans ignore most social values
while they base their choices on their selfish “utility functions.”234 Many
environmental laws, such as fines, penalties, and prohibitions, along with
market-based instruments like taxes and cap-and-trade systems, are all
based on this traditional rational choice model.235
By the latter part of the twentieth century, explanatory science
began to cast doubt about these standard reasons for human behavior.236
Observed behaviors seemed inconsistent with the orthodoxy of homo
economicus.237 A new theory arose that seems equally able to explain
human choices about our environmental surroundings: behavioral eco-
nomics.238 This new explanatory theory of human behavior presumes that
229 Judith Koons, What is Earth Jurisprudence?: Key Principles to Transform Law for the
Health of the Planet, 18 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 47, 47 (2009); Rights of Nature Law, Policy
and Education, HARMONY WITH NATURE, http://www.harmonywithnatureun.org/rightsOf
Nature/ [https://perma.cc/5HP2-7WHC] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).
230 DANIEL COHEN, HOMO ECONOMICUS: THE PROPHET OF MODERN TIMES 15–17 (2014).
231 See generally Elizabth Gsottbaner, Environmental Policy Theory Given Bounded Ra-
tionality and Other-Regarding Preferences, 49 ENVTL. & RESOURCES ECON. 263 (June 2011)
(describing the assumption of homo economicus in relation to environmental policy and
behavioral economics).
232 Id.
233 LAITOS & OKULSKI, supra note 113, at 32.
234 WILLIAM NORDHAUS, THE CLIMATE CASINO: RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND ECONOMICS FOR
A CHANGING WORLD 19–23 (2014).
235 Id. at 239–43.
236 LAITOS & OKULSKI, supra note 113, at 126.
237 Id. at 207.
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RATIONAL HUMAN AND THE CHAOTIC REALTY 239 (2014).
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individuals are equally susceptible to a selfless desire to enhance collec-
tive welfare.239 According to this theory, humans often display a willing-
ness, known as “green behavior,” to incur certain costs because of the
psychic gain experienced knowing that the natural environmental
thereby benefits.240
Behavioral economics has slowly become an accepted explanatory
science, which suggests we need to rethink environmental policy.241 This
brand of economic “science” holds that people are more responsive to de-
sired, rather than undesired information.242 If so, environmental laws
should do more than impose a flat mandate, or prohibit certain behav-
iors, or issue a command-and-control rule.243 Environmental laws should
disclose to the public how well a person is doing in terms of environmental
conscientiousness—for example, how energy-efficient they are compared
to their neighbors.244 Indeed, behavioral economics urges environmental
policymakers not to compel environmentally friendly behaviors, but to
persuade people while preserving their freedom of choice.245
2. Legal Systems That More Realistically Reflect Human Behavior
There have been a number of twenty-first century environmental
policies, either proposed or adopted, that reflect this more enlightened,
and empirically derived, modern view of human behavior.
a. Impose Positive Duties
Much of traditional environmental law entails “negative laws.”246
These are laws that in different ways repeat the notion that humans are
239 PETER SINGER, THE MOST GOOD YOU CAN DO: HOW EFFECTIVE ALTRUISM IS CHANGING
IDEAS ABOUT LIVING ETHICALLY 4–5, 7 (2015).
240 See EUROPEAN COMM’N, Future Brief: Green Behavior, 4 SCIENCE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY 2–3, 8 (Oct. 2012).
241 Tansif ur Rehman, Historical context of behavioral economics, 10 INTELLECTUAL ECON.
128, 131 (2016).
242 LAITOS & OKULSKI, supra note 113, at 28.
243 Id.
244 See, e.g., Jim Tankersley, Can We Nudge People into Conserving Energy?, WASH. POST
(Oct. 27, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/storyline/wp/2014/10/24/can-we
-shame-people-into-conserving-energy/?utm_term=.07cda0ad0b6a [https://perma.cc/87ZF
-HAV8].
245 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE? THE POLITICS OF LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM 57–58
(2014).
246 LAITOS & OKULSKI, supra note 113, at 38.
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“harming” the natural environment.247 This perspective usually results
in laws ordering humans to not take actions that perpetuate the harm.248
Modern behavioral economics reveal that humans prefer to be told what
to do, instead of being ordered not to do certain acts.249 Several states and
cities have recognized this truth about humans.250 California will require
solar panels on new homes starting in 2020, and Denver, Colorado man-
dates rooftop living green coverings for all new buildings larger than 25,000
square feet.251
b. Towards “Soft” Government Paternalism
Environmental policy influenced by behavioral economics uses the
mildest and most choice-preserving forms of government intervention.252
Scholars call these policy instruments “nudges.”253 The central idea behind
nudges as a policy choice is social science research suggesting that soft
government paternalism (policies that persuade) are more effective than
“hard” government paternalism (policies that compel).254 Behavioral econo-
mists have found that soft paternalism is more libertarian in that it tends
to preserve freedom of choice; people exercising that choice are promoting
their own ends as they understand them.255 Environmental nudges
include disclosure of information (e.g., mileage-per-gallon estimates for
new cars), warnings (e.g., comparing a consumer’s energy use on their
utility bill with other neighbors), and promoting behavior that signals a
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Id. at 16–40.
250 Jon Murray, As nation’s strictest green roof law takes effect in Denver, plenty of uncer-
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belief in the value of the behavior (e.g., residents installing solar panels
on their home, influencing similar behavior by their neighbors).256
c. The Utility of Cooperation and Common Property
Standard neoclassical economics assumes that whenever there is
an open-access “commons,” like a fishery, grazing lands, or common-field
agriculture, individual resource users will seek to exploit the resource be-
fore other users do the same.257 The result is a “tragedy” of the open-access
resource, requiring the imposition of property rights or government regu-
lation.258 However, scholars who have empirically studied such commons
have realized that another driver will sometimes override this race to use
the common resource—the human desire to cooperate with otherwise
competing individuals to foster larger community ends.259
Explanatory science has been able to shed light on what leads (or
fails to lead) resource users to cooperate in order to improve a common
property regime that averts resource overuse.260 It appears that individu-
als will work together voluntarily if other similarly situated individuals
do likewise and if the long-term benefits of cooperation exceed the long-
term benefits of an individualistic strategy.261
d. Game Theory
Explanatory science offered another model to policymakers wishing
to bring about cooperation between resource users: game theory.262 Game
theory shares with complexity theory the idea that natural equilibria are
possible if the multiple players in the resources game adopt informed
256 SUNSTEIN, supra note 245, at 17; Gordon T. Kraft-Todd et al., Credibility-Enhancing
Displays Promote the Provision of Non-Normative Public Goods, 563 NATURE 245, 245–46
(Oct. 24, 2018).
257 Hardin, supra note 74.
258 Id. at 1245; S.V. Ciriacy-Wantrup & Richard Bishop, “Common Property” as a Concept
of Natural Resources Policy, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 713, 714 (1975).
259 ROGER SCRUTON, CONSERVATISM: AN INVITATION TO THE GREAT TRADITION 10 (2018) (stat-
ing that human beings live naturally together in communities); D. ZOHRA & I. MARSHALL,
THE QUANTUM SOCIETY: MIND, PHYSICS, AND A NEW SOCIAL VISION 37–38 (1994).
260 ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COL-
LECTIVE ACTION 186 (1990).
261 Id.
262 See Shi-Ling Hsu, A Game Theoretic Approach to Regulatory Negotiation and a Frame-
work for Empirical Analysis, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 33, 63–65 (2002); Lubell, supra note
71, at 538.
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norms for decision-making.263 Environmental policy can encourage nego-
tiation among stakeholders that can result in adaptive collaboration.264
Use of game theory can be a regulatory strategy to bring about the benefits
of cooperation between agencies and resource users.
e. Alternative Policy Goals
Traditional environmental policy is often built upon the belief that
environmental laws exist to “clean up” the environment, or to make envi-
ronmental goods and resources “safe” for humans.265 Utilitarian science
would supply the data to policymakers to ensure the end goals of an
environment that was clean and safe.266 Explanatory science has offered
a different end game for environmental laws. A growing body of research
is revealing that what humans really want is to feel good—they desire
human happiness and well-being.267 Those who set environmental policy
might tap into this science-based approach to improving individual and
social levels of well-being. What humans desire is more complicated and
nuanced than simply reducing pollution levels and preserving more en-
dangered wildlife.268
IV. SCIENCE DETERMINES POLICY CONSISTENT WITH NATURE’S LAWS
Humans initially tended to view nature as a mortal enemy. The
natural world threatened us, and often stood in the way of our survival.
As humans became more technologically sophisticated, beginning in the
seventeenth century, we embraced the anthropocentric belief that nature
and its natural resources were meant for productive human use.269 For
the next three centuries, humans exploited nature by utilizing its seem-
ingly limitless raw materials and pollution sinks.270 Humans perceived
263 See generally SHAUN HARGREAVES HEAP & YANIS NAROUFAKIS, GAME THEORY 41–79
(1995) (explaining the elements and concepts of game theory).
264 AXELROD, supra note 83, at 19–20; Hornstein, supra note 69, at 949–50.
265 See generally Main U.S. Environmental Laws, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY (2003),
http://environ.andrew.cmu.edu/m3/s7/us_laws.shtml [https://perma.cc/D7QC-7BBR] (de-
scribing American laws designed to promote safety and cleanliness).
266 Houck, supra note 5, at 165, 169.
267 See generally C. ROBERT CLONINGER, FEELING GOOD: THE SCIENCE OF WELL-BEING
(2004); THE SCIENCE OF WELL-BEING (F. Huppert, N. Baylis & B. Keverne eds., 2005).
268 Id.
269 Jan Laitos & Lauren Wolorgevicz, Why Environmental Laws Fail, 39 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 24–28 (2014).
270 Id.
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that they were separate from nature, which meant that environmental
goods were for our benefit—to extract, consume, or receive our wastes.271
By the twentieth century, it was no longer possible to take seri-
ously the premise that nature was a threat to humans; it became obvious
that humans, and human exploitation of the environment, were a threat
to the workings of nature.272 This observation, along with warnings by
commentators about the loss of wilderness and contamination of land, air,
and waste,273 led to the invention of “environmental law.” The catalyst for
environmental protection laws can still be characterized as anthropocen-
tric and based on assumptions about the inherent separateness between
humans and nature. Utilitarian science informed environmental policy.274
By the twenty-first century, explanatory science influences more
environmental policy. Explanatory science demonstrates that nature has
no “natural baselines” for policy to restore and preserve.275 Rather, the
ecological reality is one of non-linear, constant complex change, where
adaptive dynamism is the rule; humans and their environmental sur-
roundings are best seen as a holistic CAS.276 Moreover, explanatory sci-
ence shows that there is no separation between nature and humans;
nature adapts to humans, and as humans interact with their environ-
ment, they too adapt.277 The combined, integrated combination of human-
natural systems is an SES.278 Explanatory science has offered theories,
such as complexity theory, for policymakers to consider as tools to adopt
when addressing human-generated threats to the CAS or SES.279
271 Id. at 25.
272 See, e.g., Dino Grandoni, Drilling on federal lands increasing climate change, Trump ad-
ministration report says, DENVER POST (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.denverpost.com/2018/11
/27/drilling-federal-lands-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/J7DF-VJC4] (extracting and burn-
ing of fossil fuels from federal lands made up a quarter of all carbon dioxide emissions in
the United States).
273 For examples of these warnings and observations, see generally GEORGE PERKINS MARSH,
Man and Nature (1864), in THE ENVIRONMENTAL DEBATE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
(Peninah Neimark & Peter Rhoades Mott eds., 2017); JOHN MUIR, THE YOSEMITE (1912);
RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND (1967); supra Part II.
274 Environmental Ethics, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 12 (July 21, 2015),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-environmental/ [https://perma.cc/YT8P-LC7A].
275 Craig, supra note 106, at 31–35.
276 S.A. Levin, Ecosystems and the Biosphere as Complex Adaptive Systems, 1 ECOSYS-
TEMs 431, 431–32 (1998).
277 See Bittel, supra note 202.
278 Elinor Ostrom et al., Going Beyond Panaceas, 104 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 15,176,
15,176 (2007).
279 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Global Warming of 1.5°C, Summary
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A central thesis of this Article is that explanatory science should do
more than simply “influence” environmental policy; it should determine and
establish environmental policy. This far more dominant role of science is
warranted because of a central principle: to be effective, our environmen-
tal laws must be consistent with nature’s laws.280 Explanatory science
can both justify the truth of this prime directive, as well as identify the
principal laws of nature, to which environmental laws should conform.
The notion that science should be more prominent for environmen-
tal policy seems particularly timely when there is such a disconnect in the
United States between science and environmental policy. For example,
in late 2018, the federal government issued its National Climate Assess-
ment report, a 1700-page study produced by scientists for various federal
agencies.281 It traced the negative, costly effects of climate change upon
every region and sector in the United States, and warned of the environ-
mental devastation yet to come.282 The report contradicts every position
taken on the issue by President Trump.283 Although the report acknowl-
edges the anthropogenic causes of climate change, the Trump administra-
tion denies there is climate change, and argues that global temperature
changes are natural.284 Worse, the Trump administration’s environmental
policy is to direct federal agencies to weaken rules for curbing planet-
warming pollutants. The White House has ordered a repeal or loosening
of laws that would restrict greenhouse gases from vehicle tailpipes.285 It
has also issued orders preventing air pollution laws from applying to power
plant smokestacks.286 In 2017, President Trump announced that, due to
for Policymakers B.6.1–B.6.3 (Oct. 2018); see generally Ruhl & Katz, supra note 61 (dis-
cussing the implications of legal complexity for complex adaptive systems).
280 See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text.
281 U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT
10–11 (Nov. 2018), https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/downloads/NCA4_2018_FullReport
.pdf [https://perma.cc/KJY5-26BN].
282 Rachel Gutman, The Three Most Chilling Conclusions from the Climate Report, THE
ATLANTIC (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/11/most-chil
ling-parts-2018-climate-assessment/576598/ [https://perma.cc/S36U-V9YV].
283 Compare U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 281, at 25–32 with
notes 284–87, infra.
284 Igor Bobic, GOP Shrugs Off Bombshell Climate Report, HUFFPOST (Nov. 25, 2018),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/climate-change-report-gop_us_5bfab61de4b0771fb6
b9bf48 [https://perma.cc/JG65-S2QD].
285 Coral Davenport, Trump Administration Unveils Its Plan to Relax Car Pollution Rules,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/02/climate/trump-auto-emis
sions-california.html [https://perma.cc/GMX4-NH59].
286 Coral Davenport, Trump Administration’s Strategy on Climate: Try to Bury Its Own
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a lack of scientific proof, he would withdraw the United States from the
2015 landmark Paris Climate Accord.287 At a time when United States’
environmental policy is undergoing what has been called “a new frontier
of disavowance of science,”288 it seems appropriate to make the case that
science should not be ignored, but instead should set policy.
A. The Principle of Universality: Why Environmental Laws Should
Be Consistent with Nature’s Laws
There are two general categories of “laws.” One kind of law is a
system of rules which a country or community recognizes as regulating
the actions of its members, who are usually humans or human-created
institutions.289 The other kind of law is “a statement of fact, deduced from
observation, to the effect that a particular natural or scientific phenome-
non always occurs if certain conditions are present.”290 The latter type of
law describes the physical laws that govern how things in our environment
work, how natural systems function, and how the universe operates.291 To
qualify as a “law” under this second meaning, the law must be derived from
scientific observations, experimental testing, and mathematical formulas.292
Such physical laws constitute the best explanation of the natural world;
they also enable us to make reliable predictions about the workings of
the Earth’s environment.
An “environmental law” is a law that regulates, and often tries to
mitigate, the impact of human activities on nature and the physical envi-
ronment in order to achieve a “healthy environment” and “protect natural
systems.”293 As such, environmental laws involve both the first type of
law—those laws that regulate human behavior—as well as the second type
of law—those laws that reveal truths about the dynamics of nature. To be
Scientific Report, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/25/climate
/trump-climate-report.html [https://perma.cc/RMY6-U56R].
287 Robinson Meyer, A Grave Climate Warning, Buried on Black Friday, THE ATLANTIC
(Nov. 23, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/11/national-climate-as
sessment-black-friday/576589/ [https://perma.cc/5JXK-JYBC].
288 Davenport, supra note 286 (quoting William K. Reilly, head of the EPA under President
George H.W. Bush).
289 Law—Definition of Law in English, OXFORD DICTIONARIES (2019), https://en.oxforddic
tionaries.com/definition/law [https://perma.cc/3K5G-S6J2].
290 Id. (emphasis added).
291 Id.
292 John T. Roberts, Measurability and Physical Laws, 144 SYNTHESE 433, 434 (2005).
293 ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 1, 66 (8th ed. 2018).
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effective, it would follow that environmental laws should be concerned not
only with human acts that affect the environment, but also with the univer-
sal “laws” that govern that natural environment. Explanatory science has
revealed that nature usually acts as a CAS, and that the humans-and-
nature pairing is a non-divisible, integrated holistic SES.294 Explanatory
science has also revealed that the natural environment seems to operate
according to fixed, definite rules.295 This realization is known as the Prin-
ciple of Universality.296
The Principle of Universality is a “law” that governs nature. It holds
that for the natural forces and relationships that scientists observe in the
natural world, all apply universally, regardless of location or time.297 In
other words, there are predictable rules by which nature always oper-
ates,298 ranging from gravity to chemical reactivity to photosynthesis to
the homologous macromolecules (DNA, RNA) that derive from a common
ancestor. These laws determine how things work everywhere in the uni-
verse, no matter when or by whom the experiment is carried out, and
irrespective of scale.299 The universal laws of nature encompass physics,
chemistry, and biology.300
Since environmental law imposes rules on humans to regulate
their anthropogenic impact on nature,301 and since nature itself (includ-
ing the Earth’s environment) behaves in accordance with general, univer-
sal rules,302 it would seem that there should be a linkage between our
environmental laws and nature’s laws. The Principle of Universality sug-
gests this result. So too does common logic: “[I]f laws are to be effective
294 See supra notes 276–79.
295 See PEDRO FERREIRA, THE PERFECT THEORY 4–5 (2014).
296 See Pazameta, supra note 21, at 1.
297 See FERREIRA, supra note 295, at 4–5. It was Albert Einstein who concluded that the
laws of physics and nature must look the same in any “inertial frame,” which means that
the laws of nature should be the same at all locations and times. Id.
298 See Pazameta, supra note 21, at 1.
299 Id.
300 Id.; Laws of Biology and True Universality, BIOPOLYVERSE (Sept. 8, 2013), https://biopoly
verse.com/2013/09/08/laws-of-biology-and-true-universality/ [https://perma.cc/S5FH-V7VJ];
How the Universe Works—Scientists Baffled by Laws of Nature, EVERYSTUDENT.COM, http://
www.everystudent.com/wires/organized [https://perma.cc/3NZZ-AM65] (last visited Mar. 11,
2019). See Paul C.W. Davies & Sara I. Walker, The hidden simplicity of biology, 2016 REP.
PROG. PHYS. 79 102,601, 102,601.
301 A. Dan Tarlock, Is There a There There in Environmental Law?, J. LAND USE & ENVTL.
L. 213, 235 (2004).
302 NEIL DEGRASSE TYSON & DONALD GOLDSMITH, ORIGINS: FOURTEEN BILLION YEARS OF
COSMIC EVOLUTION 16 (2004).
798 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 43:759
they need to recognize the inherent subject matter with which they are
concerned. This means that a governance system must to some extent re-
flect, or at least correspond with, the qualities of that which it is seeking
to regulate.”303
Anthropogenic environmental law systems should reflect the cen-
tral attributes of the natural systems in which they are embedded. These
systems can be discovered because they all follow a code of nature.304 What,
then, are the central attributes, or “laws,” of nature?
B. The Two Central Laws of Nature
The object of environmental law is to alter the actions of humans
toward their environmental surroundings. Traditional environmental
laws have been fashioned to satisfy anthropocentric needs, and anthropo-
morphic assumptions about how nature and the environment work.305 To
succeed and be effective, environmental policy should not simply appease
human needs regarding the human environment; environmental policy
must obey the laws of the natural environment. For knowledge of the
physical environment surrounding humans, and the universal laws gov-
erning this environment, we should turn to science. And when we do,
science reveals that the two central hallmarks of nature are symmetry
and economy.306 The laws of symmetry and economy guide and explain
the workings of the natural environment.307
1. Symmetry
Over the course of the twentieth century and continuing through
the present, scientists have increasingly agreed that the idea of symmetry
dominates our understanding of the fundamental laws of the natural en-
vironment.308 What scientists, mathematicians, physicists, and biologists
have come to realize is that if one wishes to learn the immutable laws of
the environment, one needs to start with symmetry. The requirements of
303 CULLINAN, supra note 100, at 26.
304 DEGRASSE TYSON & GOLDSMITH, supra note 302, at 16.
305 JAN G. LAITOS, THE RIGHT OF NONUSE 55, 169 (2012); Laitos & Wolorgevicz, supra note
269, at 1, 25.
306 See infra notes 309–16.
307 WILCZEK, supra note 23, at 11, 49; Steven Weinberg, Symmetry: A “Key to Nature’s Se-
crets,” N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Oct. 27, 2011) at 1, 2.
308 See infra notes 309–16.
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symmetry come first, and typically dictate the laws that nature then must
obey; nature’s laws may be deduced from the requirement of symmetry.309
Nobel Laureate Frank Wilczek defines symmetry as “change with-
out change.”310 In a mathematical sense, the equation A=B is symmetrical.
If one reverses the equation so that B=A, there has been a change in form,
but not content. Transforming A=B to B=A is a change without change;
the equation is symmetrical.
Similarly, a symmetry of some biological structure, some environ-
mental good, or of some force observed in the universe is a transformation
of that structure, good, or force that leaves properties of the structure un-
changed.311 This view of nature predicts how biological organisms will
evolve. Bilateral symmetry is so prevalent in animals on Earth that one
may presume that natural selection prefers living organisms that exhibit
this kind of symmetry.312 Indeed, bilateral symmetry helped James
Watson and Frances Crick deduce that the DNA molecule consists of two
symmetrical strands of a double helix.313 Symmetry is equally integral to
the way the forces of the universe work; Albert Einstein used symmetry
as a guiding principle when he devised his General Theory of Relativity.314
Under the symmetry in the universe called general covariance, physical
laws act the same whether an object is accelerating or at rest: the force
of gravity and the force resulting from acceleration are symmetrical
facets of the same force.315
Symmetry is fundamental to the core theories of physics, relativity,
and even quantum theory, and is also relevant to patterns observed in the
natural world, including living organisms in the biosphere.316 Why, then, is
symmetry such a driving force in nature? Science suggests that symmetry
is prevalent because it simplifies things. Symmetry permits living biological
309 MARCO LIVIO, THE EQUATION THAT COULDN’T BE SOLVED: HOW MATHEMATICAL GENIUS
DISCOVERED THE LANGUAGE OF SYMMETRY 43, 205, 231 (2005).
310 WILCZEK, supra note 23, at 137, 238. See also HERMANN WEYL, SYMMETRY 3 (1983) (“A
thing is symmetrical if there is something you can do to it so that after you have finished
doing it, it looks the same as before.”).
311 IAN STEWART, SYMMETRY: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 19 (2013).
312 Mario Livio, Why Are We Symmetrical?, HUFFPOST (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffing
tonpost.com/mario-livio/why-are-we-symmetrical_b_1836534.html [https://perma.cc
/VH46-L7FR].
313 J.D. Watson & F.H. Crick, Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids, 171 NATURE 737, 737
(Apr. 25, 1953).
314 Special Relativity as a Symmetry of Nature, UNIV. BRITISH COLUMBIA (2019), https://
www.phas.ubc.ca/~mav/p526/read5.pdf [https://perma.cc/B62L-58LV].
315 FERREIRA, supra note 295, at 13.
316 IAN STEWART, WHY BEAUTY IS TRUTH: A HISTORY OF SYMMETRY vii–viii (2007).
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organisms to economize how they function;317 symmetry ensures that
larger objects in the universe, like stars and planets, eventually achieve
a natural minimum-energy configuration.318 Wherever one finds symme-
try in nature, what will also be found is a corresponding conservation of
momentum or energy.319 Symmetry is thereby linked to the other central
law governing the natural environment: the economy of means.
2. Economy
The concept of “economy” has been defined as “producing an abun-
dance of effects from very limited means.”320 In other words, when nature
is faced with a question—what should be the shape of a snowflake, the
structure of the DNA molecule, or the organization of a bee’s honeycomb?—
nature will inevitably opt for the simplest, most efficient, most economical
solution. Consistent with the first central principle underlying nature’s
laws,321 that solution will employ symmetry.
A snowflake is most stable when its shape is symmetrically six-
sided.322 The sturdy, billions of years old DNA molecule, is a symmetrical
double helix.323 The cells of a bee’s honeycomb are always a hexagon.324
Why a hexagon? Much effort is required for bees to make honeycombs;
many individual cells must be made in order to have sufficient comb for
storing honey, the bees’ natural food source.325 But why should these cells
be hexagonal, instead of round, triangular, or square? The bees need to
find a shape where gaps are minimized, no space is wasted, where each
individual cell shares its walls with its neighbor, so that the bees can
produce the maximum number of cells with the amount of wax used.326
The bees construct hexagons because that shape, more so than any other
317 STEWART, supra note 311, at 90–91; WILCZEK, supra note 23, at 49.
318 STEWART, supra note 311, at 107.
319 LIVIO, supra note 309, at 217 (this principle is known as Noether’s Theorem).
320 WILCZEK, supra note 23, at 11, 15.
321 See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text.
322 See Ian Stewart, Symmetry of Snowflakes, WARWICK KNOWLEDGE CENTRE ARCHIVE
(Jan. 3, 2016), https://warwick.ac.uk/newsandevents/knowledge-archive/science/snow
flakes/ [https://perma.cc/HM5Q-ELZL].
323 See generally Watson & Crick, supra note 313 (describing the double helix).
324 Robert Krulwich, What Is It About Bees and Honeycombs?, NPR (May 14, 2013), https://
www.npr.org/sections/krulwich/2013/05/13/183704091/what-is-it-about-bees-and-hexagons
[https://perma.cc/3PWE-H9A5].
325 Id.
326 Id.
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shape in nature, holds the most honey.327 Hexagons break up flat space
into little units more economically, using less wax in doing so.328 Consis-
tent with nature’s law of “economy of means,” hexagonal honeycombs
hold the most amount of honey while using the least amount of wax.329
And hexagons are, of course, symmetrical.330
A “law” holding that nature will favor the simplest, most economi-
cal approach, or an approach producing “an abundance of effects from very
limited means,” is consistent with Occam’s Razor, or the principle of parsi-
mony.331 Occam’s Razor advises that when one has to choose from a set
of possible explanations for a given phenomenon, the “simplest” explanation
is usually the correct one.332 The Occam’s Razor principle underlies all sci-
entific modeling of the natural environment, and is consistent with how
nature usually prefers the simplest solution: “[a]lthough the symmetries
may be hidden from us, we can sense that they are latent in nature, govern-
ing everything about us . . . . Nature is much simpler than it looks.”333
That nature favors economy, efficiency, and simplicity334 is consis-
tent with what explanatory science has discovered about complex environ-
mental systems. An unpredictable, non-linear, multidimensional system,
like the Earth’s climate, is known as a system in chaos.335 However, chaos
science has shown that one can, paradoxically, find order, patterns, and
even simplicity within such systems. A system in chaos ultimately has a
shape and boundary it will not violate, and it produces symmetrical pat-
terns.336 Nature’s law of economy and simplicity disaggregates complexity.
327 Id.
328 Id.
329 Id.
330 In 1999, a scientist at the University of Michigan named Thomas Hales produced a
mathematical proof demonstrating that “a regular hexagonal grid is the best and most
economical way to divide a surface into regions of equal area with the least total peri-
meter.” Frank Morgan, Hales Proves Hexagonal Honeycomb Conjecture, MATHEMATICAL
ASS’N OF AMERICA (June 17, 1999), https://www.maa.org/frank-morgans-math-chat-hales
-proves-hexagonal-honeycomb-conjecture [https://perma.cc/RTH2-75ZP].
331 WILCZEK, supra note 23, at 11; see E.C. Banks, The Philosophical Roots of Ernst Mach’s
Economy of Thought, 139 SYNTHESE 23, 23–25 (2004).
332 See Banks, supra note 331, at 23–25.
333 WILCZEK, supra note 23, at 165 (quoting physicist Steven Weinberg). A preference for
economical, more simple explanations is consistent with Bayesian statistics, which presume
that the more economical of two explanations is more likely to be the correct one.
334 Id. at 11.
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C. Towards an Environmental Law Paradigm That Aligns with
Nature’s Laws
There are three important takeaway lessons from the past fifty
years of environmental policy. First, environmental laws should not be
premised on a belief in human superiority or separation from our envi-
ronmental surroundings. Rather, such laws should reflect the scientific
fact that humans and the natural environment are integrated, and have
evolved together, as the SES.337 Second, environmental laws should be
consistent with a realistic model for how humans make decisions. Mod-
ern behavioral economics has caused us to rethink standard neoclassical
economic orthodoxy holding that humans optimize and maximize individual
welfare.338 Instead, human behavior appears more nuanced, and more
effectively influenced by policy urging us to do something, rather than
rules ordering us to not do something.339 Third, to be effective, environ-
mental policy should follow the Principle of Universality, which posits that
environmental laws should parallel nature’s fundamental laws.340 It seems
that the twin truths governing nature are symmetry and economy.341
Environmental policy which obeys symmetry and economy and
which is sensitive to these three lessons could take various forms. What is
proposed here is a simple and symmetrical right-duty dichotomy. The
legal right would be granted not just to humans, and not only to nature,
but to the SES. The duty would be imposed only on humans, as it is just
our species—homo sapiens—that is affecting Earth’s natural systems and
the biosphere.
1. A New Legal Right to a “Safe Operating Space”
The proposed right granted to the SES would be a “positive” right,
in that it would provide something to the right-holder.342 It is a claim on
legal grounds to obtain something.343 This SES right would be to obtain
337 See LAITOS & OKULSKI, supra note 113, at 107. See generally Levin et al., supra note
183; ELLIS, supra note 177.
338 See supra notes 238–45, 253, and accompanying text.
339 Id.
340 See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text.
341 WILCZEK, supra note 23, at 11, 49.
342 See Leif Wenar, Rights, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Sept. 9, 2015),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/rights/ [https://perma.cc/5ZLN-GKLX].
343 R.M. HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS 44 (1952).
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what science is calling a “safe operating space.”344 The idea of a safe op-
erating space is premised on a science-based model of environmental
conditions that permit Earth’s natural systems to operate so that the SES
may exist.345 These systems, and the resulting safe operating space, require
that so-called “planetary boundaries” are not breached.346 Science defines
planetary boundaries as environmental limits within which the SES can
safely operate.347 Anthropocentric actions have already compromised four
such boundaries—climate change, biosphere integrity, biochemical flows,
and land system changes.348 The proposed legal “right” held by the SES
would be to the protection of Earth systems so as to create a global safe
operating space349 and the restoration of planetary boundaries.350
Since the right is held by the SES, it may be raised by either of
the two components that make up the SES: humans, or ecological sys-
tems and organisms.351 Although the nonhuman components of the SES
will not be able to assert this right on their own, humans can raise the
rights of ecological/biological interests on behalf of the SES through the
doctrine of just tertii.352 The right should be asserted to promote the
resilience and sustainability of Earth’s SES.353 It should be raised when-
ever there are anthropogenic actions that threaten to either disconnect
human actions from the functioning of Earth’s ecological systems or pre-
vent a safe operating space for the SES.354
The proposed right conforms to the two central tenets of nature’s
laws: symmetry and economy. It is accompanied by a reciprocal, and
344 Johan Rockström et al., Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating Space for
Humanity, 461 NATURE 472, 472 (2009).
345 See generally Will Steffen et al., Planetary Boundaries: Guiding Human Development on
a Changing Planet, 347 SCI. 6223 (Feb. 15, 2015) (describing this science-based model).
346 Id. at 736–38.
347 Id.
348 Id.
349 T. Hayha et al., Operationalizing the Concept of a Safe Operating Space at the EU
Level—First Steps and Explorations, STOCKHOLM RESILIENCE CENTER 4 (2018); John
McLaughlin, Safe Operating Space for Humanity at a Regional Scale, 23 ECOLOGY & SCI.
(2018), at 1–2.
350 Katherine Richardson et al., Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating
Space for Humanity, 14 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y (2009), at 1–2, 4, 19–21.
351 LAITOS & OKULSKI, supra note 113, at 21, 39.
352 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410–11 (1999); CULLINAN, supra note 100, at 108.
353 Carl Folke et al., Adaptive Governance of Social-Ecological Systems, 30 ANN. REV. ENVTL.
RESOURCES 441, 443–44 (2005).
354 See, e.g., NAVIGATING SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS 1–2 (F. Berkes, J. Colding & C. Folke,
eds.) (2003) (describing human domination of Earth and the challenges this poses for com-
plex systems).
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symmetrical, legal duty, and it has economy; it is simple to understand
and implement. Consistent with symmetry, the positive right has a corol-
lary to this right, a corresponding affirmative duty. As noted below, the
right to a safe operating space requires a duty to support natural systems,
biological organisms, and environmental goods so that humans as a spe-
cies will be able to survive.355 A right-duty dichotomy satisfies symmetry,
while the right held by the SES ensures economy. It does not require a
vast administrative superstructure with myriad top-down regulations.
A rights system conserves legal resources. The right is held by the twin
components of the SES. It is bottom-up, triggered only when one of the
parts of the SES asserts the right to ensure a safe operating space.
2. A Human Duty to the Environment
If a positive right is held by the Earth-based SES, then symmetry
predicts that an affirmative duty should be also created. The existence of
a positive right to a safe operating space suggests there must be, or should
be, a symmetrical affirmative duty to provide that safe space. While the
right is held by the SES, the duty is imposed on the “social” component of
the SES right-holder: humans. Homo sapiens has a duty to the SES to
maintain planetary boundaries and natural systems so that human life
is sustained. Humans alone bear the burden of the affirmative obligation
because, in the Anthropocene Era, only one species is so affecting the na-
tural environment that human long-term viability cannot be assumed.356
Since the right to a safe operating space held by the SES is positive,
so too is the correlative duty held by humans. A positive duty is more than
a duty to not act; it is an affirmative obligation to actively provide some-
thing357 to the right-holder: the SES. In short, humans should have a duty
to provide the SES with a safe operating space. The important role of af-
firmative duties in environmental policy has been succinctly summarized
by a leading American environmental law scholar, Professor A. Dan
Tarlock: “[i]f environmental protection is to succeed as a legitimate, perma-
nent policy, it must evolve from a negative strategy of simply trying to stop
an action that disturbs a mythical natural baseline, to a pervasive affirma-
tive one which provides incentives for creative . . . protection solutions.”358
355 See infra Section IV.C.2.
356 Will Steffen et al., The Anthropocene: From Global Change to Planetary Stewardship,
40 AMBIO 739, 740 (2011).
357 See Marcus G. Singer, Negative and Positive Duties, 15 PHIL. Q. 97, 98–99 (Apr. 1965).
358 Tarlock, supra note 96, at 243 (emphasis added).
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A duty to provide something, instead of an obligation to halt or
prevent something, is consistent with what behavioral economics tells us
about human decision-making. Scientific research has revealed what
motivates people to change. Humans are motivated not when they are
threatened, but when their affirmative actions have power, when they can
do something.359 As noted previously in this Article, an environmental law
is efficient, and more likely to succeed, when it tells humans what to do
instead of ordering them what not to do.360 Moreover, an affirmative duty
to provide for the right-holder is simpler than a negative duty to avoid
harming the right-holder.361 A simpler duty conforms to nature’s prefer-
ence for “economy.”
CONCLUSION
While science, especially utilitarian science, has always played a
prominent role in the development of environmental policy, it should now
assume a different role. Instead of informing policy, it should direct policy.
The science that performs this task should not be utilitarian science, but
explanatory science. Environmental policymakers who turn to explana-
tory science will discover that the Principle of Universality can guide the
formulation of environmental laws that actually bring about efficient
change to natural environmental systems. This science-based Principle,
which underscores physics, chemistry, and biology, suggests that our
environmental laws should be consistent with nature’s laws. The two
central truths of the universe, and Earth’s environment, are symmetry
and economy. To succeed, our environmental laws should similarly fea-
ture a symmetrical structure, such as a right-duty dichotomy. This di-
chotomy is not to be implemented by a huge government bureaucracy,
but by the holders of the right and duty. This bottom-up system is simple
and reflects economy.
359 John Brandon, Is Your Culture One of Encouragement or Blame?, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 20,
2016), https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/success/inc/tca-is-your-culture-one-of-en
couragement-or-blame-20161109-story.html [https://perma.cc/7FXX-D3EV].
360 See supra notes 240–44 and accompanying text.
361 T. Irwin, Pufendorf, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF ETHICS: HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL STUDY
351–52 (2011).

